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The explosive growth of Online Social Networks (OSNs) over the past few years has
redefned the way people interact with existing friends and especially make new friends.
OSNs have also become a great new marketplace for trade among the users. However, the
associated privacy risks make users vulnerable to severe privacy threats. In this dissertation, we design protocols for private distributed social proximity matching and a private
distributed auction based marketplace framework for OSNs.
In particular, an OSN user looks for matching profle attributes when trying to broaden
his/her social circle. However, revealing private attributes is a potential privacy threat.
Distributed private profle matching in OSNs mainly involves using cryptographic tools to
compute profle attributes matching privately such that no participating user knows more
than the common profle attributes. In this work, we defne a new asymmetric distributed
social proximity measure between two users in an OSN by taking into account the weighted
profle attributes (communities) of the users and that of their friends’. For users with

different privacy requirements, we design three private proximity matching protocols with
increasing privacy levels. Our protocol with highest privacy level ensures that each user’s
proximity threshold is satisfed before revealing any matching information.
The use of e-commerce has exploded in the last decade along with the associated security and privacy risks. Frequent security breaches in the e-commerce service providers’
centralized servers compromise consumers’ sensitive private and fnancial information.
Besides, a consumer’s purchase history stored in those servers can be used to reconstruct
the consumer’s profle and for a variety of other privacy intrusive purposes like directed
marketing. To this end, we propose a secure and private distributed auction framework
called SPA, based on decentralized online social networks (DOSNs) for the frst time in
the literature. The participants in SPA require no trust among each other, trade anonymously, and the security and privacy of the auction is guaranteed. The effciency, in terms
of communication and computation, of proposed private auction protocol is at least an order of magnitude better than existing distributed private auction protocols and is suitable
for marketplace with large number of participants.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The Internet incorporated security and privacy as an afterthought in its design. The
awareness and sophistication in technology for online security and privacy have seen tremendous improvement over the past decade. However, the threats for online security and privacy have also evolved and become more challenging than ever before. The sophistication
at which attackers compromise users’ sensitive information has improved signifcantly over
the years. The centralized servers of the Internet service providers represent single point of
failure and have been attacked frequently in the past compromising millions of customers’
private data. Besides, they have also been used as tools for mass surveillance by the government organizations. In addition to malicious hackers/attackers stealing users’ private
information, primarily with fnancial motive, the changing threat model landscape also
includes Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) and global surveillance capability from very
resourceful entities and organizations. The future system design need to be secure against
such challenging and evolving threat models. The need for better online security and privacy against such threat models has brought several decentralized solutions from academia.
Tor [21] is one such solutions which has been used widely as anonymous browsing tool to
tackle Internet surveillance in hostile environment and to protect privacy of users. Peer to

1

peer crypto currency Bitcoin [57] is a decentralized electronic cash that may have potential
to disrupt traditional centralized banking system. Similarly, Diaspora [1] is a decentralized online social network (DOSN), where users own their data and store on their own
servers or on the servers they trust. Motivated by such robust decentralized solutions, in
this dissertation, we propose protocols for private social proximity matching based on a
novel asymmetric social proximity measure, and a secure and private distributed auction
framework called SPA, for the frst time in the literature, based on online social networks.
The explosive growth of Online Social Networks (OSNs) over the past decade has
dramatically changed the way people communicate with their peers, consume/produce information, conduct business, and expand their social circles. The ease at which people
communicate with their peers and to the world has challenged the traditional unidirectional information fow paradigm, where information (e.g., breaking news) fows mainly
through a source (e.g., a news organization) to the consumers. The new multidirectional
information fow paradigm, where users of OSNs (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, YouTube) are
both the sources and and the consumers of the information, has benefted ordinary users
in many ways. People fnd it easier to share their ideas in their friend circles and to connect to new people, who share similar interests. Besides, the rich connectivity of OSNs
provides a new avenue for e-commerce among the users. However, the centralized architecture of the traditional OSNs poses serious privacy threats to users. The central servers
store and monetize on users’ sensitive private information and become a single point of
failure, which have been breached by malicious attackers [12, 37] frequently leading to
compromised users’ private data. The motivation of preserving users’ privacy has led to
2

privacy preserving decentralized OSN architectures [1, 8, 18], where users store their private data on their own servers or on the servers they trust. In this dissertation work, we
design protocols for private social proximity matching between two users in an OSN based
on a novel asymmetric social proximity measure.
People look for shared attributes (e.g., interests, geography, friends, and religion) when
initiating/responding to new friendship requests. A naive way of matching the attributes
is to list each one’s attributes and fnd the match. However, people are reluctant to reveal
their attributes to a stranger. A Trusted Third Party (TTP) can help match the attributes
if it is trusted to hold everybody’s attributes securely and return the matching attributes
upon request by the users. Similar to the central servers in the traditional OSNs, the TTP
stores the attributes of each user and represents a single point of failure. Besides, people
are increasingly hesitant to store their personal information in a centralized server or TTP.
The problem of matching attributes between two users privately without a TTP can be
solved with the help of cryptography. Users with private attributes set can take part in
cryptographic protocol transactions to fnd the common attributes among them without
revealing additional information about their attributes to one another. There have been
several works in cryptography, which can be used to fnd the intersection of the input set
(or some function thereof) of participating users. In this work we defne an asymmetric
social proximity metric between two users based on weighted attributes of the users and
their friends’. We then propose three protocols for privately matching the social proximity
between two users for users with varying degree of privacy requirements. In our protocol
with the highest privacy level, participating users make sure the social proximity metric,
3

defned independently by each of them, satisfes their own private thresholds before letting
the other user know the matching information. The protocols are introduced in details with
our specifc contributions in Chapter 2.
E-commerce has become an important part of commerce in today’s world. It enables
easy access to goods and services via the Internet. However, the security and privacy
risks associated with e-commerce are also on the rise. Attackers are frequently able to
compromise the e-commerce service providers’ secure servers and steal consumers’ private
information. A consumer’s history of sales/purchases stored in those servers is critically
sensitive private data, which can be exploited for many privacy intrusive purposes like
directed marketing and more importantly consumer profling. Moreover, in auction based
e-commerce like eBay, consumers need to trust on the honesty of the auctioneer (server).
The bidding statistics also reveals important private information about the users’ valuation
of the goods. If malicious, the server may increase its fnancial gain by exploiting the
bidding statistics and colluding with sellers. In light of these security and privacy threats,
we envision a distributed private marketplace framework, where users do not need to trust
any third party servers and can trade anonymously with bid privacy and auction correctness
guarantee. In this regard, we propose SPA: a Secure and Private Auction framework based
on decentralized online social networks, which, to the best of our knowledge, is the frst
protocol of its kind for online social networks in the literature. We present the proposed
framework in detail in Chapter 3.
The rest of the proposal is organized as follows. In the next Chapter (Chapter 2), we
detail our proposed asymmetric social proximity measure and cryptographic protocols for
4

private social proximity matching. The proposed SPA framework is presented in Chpater
3 with real social network data set experiment and simulations to verify the cost of computation and communication. Finally, in Chapter 4 we conclude our dissertation with future
plans.
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CHAPTER 2
ASYMMETRIC SOCIAL PROXIMITY BASED PRIVATE MATCHING PROTOCOLS
FOR ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS

2.1

Introduction
Online Social Networks (OSNs) have had tremendous growth over the past few years.

OSNs such as Facebook, Google+ , Linkedin are some of the most visited sites on the Internet [4], where users spend a signifcant fraction of their online time. Besides, increasing
popularity of smart phones has extended the platforms used for accessing online social networks and provided a plethora of opportunities for mobile social networking. OSNs have
redefned the way people interact with existing friends, and more importantly, make new
friends. In particular, people can now explore potential friendships via OSNs, by looking
for common interests, friends, and symptoms, close geographic proximity, etc., between
each other. A naive solution to fnding new friends in OSNs is using a server that stores
all the users’ information and conducting profle matching through the server. In this case,
however, the server knows all the users’ private information and becomes a single point of
failure. Thus, if the server gets compromised, all users’ privacy is at risk. For example,
Twitter was attacked in early January 2013 and about 250,000 user accounts might have
been compromised, with names and e-mails possibly being uncovered [12]. Facebook,
Apple, Microsoft were under similar attacks in February 2013 [37]. Moreover, users may
6

not have connectivity to the server all the time. Therefore, there has been growing interests
in new privacy-preserving distributed solutions to fnding friends in OSNs.
In OSNs and Mobile Social Networks (MSNs), many distributed solutions to privately
fnding the social proximity between two users have been proposed. The most common
way of determining friendship between two people is through profle matching, i.e. fnding
out if they have common profle attributes, like interests [50], [75], symptoms [46, 47, 53],
or some other social coordinates [22, 77]. In some cases, the number of common friends
also serves as the proximity measure between two users [16], [56]. Such previous works
employ various cryptographic tools to protect the privacy of the profle information of the
users in the private matching process. After two strangers, say with profle attribute sets X
and Y , execute a private matching protocol, the one who initiates the protocol will know
either X ∩ Y or some function of X ∩ Y while the other one who responds does not know
anything. Thus, a malicious user can execute the protocol with any user and leave without
letting him/her do the same.
Moreover, most previous schemes for profle matching in online/mobile social networking are based on the premise that two people are likely to establish a social relationship only if they share similar profle attributes like interests, symptoms, or some other
social coordinates. While it is true that people with similar profle attributes are likely to
be friends, this is not the only way of determining friendship. For example, a doctor’s best
friend may not necessarily always be a doctor, but can be a writer who may share very
few common profle attributes. In another example, two students who both have a lot of
good friends studying in the Electrical and Computer Engineering department may become
7

good friends, although they do not share many common profle attributes. We notice that
whether two people can become friends not only depends on whether they have anything
in common, but also is affected by whether their friends have anything in common. The
intuition behind this is simple: a friend’s friend can also be a friend.
In this work, we leverage community structures to redefne the OSN model, and propose an asymmetric social proximity between two users. In particular, we consider that
each OSN user is affliated with some communities (or groups)1 , which the user weighs
differently. We notice that the communities can actually tell a lot about their members.
There can be a wide variety of communities in an OSN like a university community, a department community, a fan community of an artist, movies, or sports, and a community of
certain professions. Besides, we notice that in real life people also value their friendships
differently. Thus, we propose an asymmetric social proximity between two users, which
is the cumulative weight of the common communities to one user considering both his/her
and his/her friends’ perceptions. We also design three different private matching protocols
based on the proposed asymmetric social proximity. The main contributions of this work
can be briefy summarized as follows.
• We defne an asymmetric social proximity measure between two users in an OSN,
which considers both each user’s and his/her friends’ perceptions on the common
communities between the two users. This proposed asymmetric social proximity
can better capture the characteristics of making friends in OSNs.
• Based on the asymmetric social proximity, we design three different private matching
protocols, i.e., L1P, L2P/EL2P, and L3P, which provide users with different privacy
levels. In particular, our protocol L3P with the highest privacy level ensures that two
users will not know any of their common communities before they become friends.
1

In what follows, we use ”communities” and ”groups” interchangeably.
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• We analyze the privacy, and computation and communication cost of the proposed
protocols. Our protocols protect users’ privacy better than the previous works based
on symptoms, interests, and the number of common friends, with lower computation
and communication cost. Particularly, in most previous schemes, e.g., [16, 22, 46,
47, 50, 53, 75], a malicious user A can request friendship with another user B and
then leave with B’s private information before B knows anything about A. In our
schemes, when one maliciousx user A requests friendship with another user B, A
can know some limited private information of B’s only if B is willing to accept the
request.
• We validate our proposed asymmetric proximity measure using real social network
data and conduct extensive simulations to evaluate the performance of the proposed
protocols in terms of computation cost, communication cost, total running time, and
energy consumption. The results show the advantages of our protocols over state-ofthe-art protocols.
The rest of the Chapter is organized as follow. We discuss the related works in Section
2.2 and present our system model in Section 2.3. We detail the proposed three asymmetric
social proximity based private matching protocols in Section 2.4. We present simulation
results in Section 2.5, and fnally conclude the Chapter in Section 2.6.

2.2

Related Work
In this section, we briefy introduce some previous studies that are most relevant to our

work.

2.2.1

Private Set Intersection (PSI) protocols

In PSI protocols, two or more parties carrying their respective input sets interact to
privately fnd the intersection set. In a two party (a server and a client) PSI protocol, the
two parties interact so that the client learns only the intersection of the two input sets and
the size of the server’s input set, while the server learns nothing but the size of the client’s
input set. Since the introductory work of Freedman, Nissim, and Pinkas (FNP) [28], several
9

PSI protocols [17, 27, 34, 35, 38, 43] secure under semi-honest and/or malicious adversary
models have been proposed. In such schemes, a client can artifcially infate its input set to
learn the server’s whole input set. Authorized PSI (APSI) protocols [9, 10, 15] avoid this
problem by verifying the participants’ inputs using some trusted authority. They involve
expensive cryptographic processes, which lay heavy burdens on users’ mobile devices.

2.2.2

Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) protocols

SMC protocols allow two or more parties to privately calculate some functions of their
inputs such that no party knows more than the function output and its own input. In particular, Yao [72] proposes the frst SMC protocol based on garbled circuits. After that,
there are a lot of works on improving security [31] and/or computation and communication complexities [5, 19, 20, 26, 30, 36]. We do not employ SMC schemes for private proximity measurement in our scheme for two reasons. First, the generic SMC protocols are
prohibitively expensive in both communication and computation. Second, our proposed
social proximity measurement involves not only the users inputs (i.e., communities), but
also their private parameters (i.e., α’s and β’s that will be introduced Section 2.3) which
cannot be fed into the circuits to calculate proximity.

2.2.3

Social Proximity

The graph structure of social networks has been exploited to derive effective proximity
measures. Katz measure [41] uses an ensemble of all the paths between two users in
the network graph to derive the social proximity. Liben-Nowell et al. [48] and Tong et
al. [67] also employ path-ensemble based methods for the future link prediction in social
10

networks and proximity measurement. The path-ensemble based proximity measures are
known to be effective in link prediction and proximity measurement in social networks
as they capture more information about the underlying social network. However, they
require the knowledge of the snapshot of the social network graph, and are prohibitively
expensive in computation. Thus, these methods are not applicable to distributed proximity
measurement.

2.2.4

Social Proximity Based Private Matching

Among distributed measurements of social proximity, one of the most common and
simplest proximity measure is the number of common friends or profle attributes between
two users of the network [16, 22, 46, 47, 50, 53]. Intuitively, as the overlap between two
user’s profle attributes or friend spaces grows, their proximity increases. Based on distributed social proximity measurement, Zhang et al. [75] use homomorphic encryption to
obtain fne-grained profle matching for mobile social networks. Similar profle matching
schemes are presented in [16, 22, 46, 50, 77]. Profle matching in mobile health social network is studied in [47, 53] to privately match health profles. Recently, Zhang et al. [74]
proposes a mechanism to match-making profle search in a decentralized multi-hop mobile
social network, where a user submits his/her “preference-profle” in order to search other
users matching the profle. Similarly, Nagy et al. [56] presents a framework for fnding
common friends in a private manner using secure computation, set intersection, and bloom
flters. Note that most of these studies focus on profle matching under the assumption that
the social proximity between two users is symmetric, i.e., the social proximity calculated
11

by each user is the same. In this work, we utilize the communities and friend circles in an
OSN to derive a realistic asymmetric social proximity in a distributed manner.

2.3

System Model

2.3.1

Network Model

Consider an online social network (OSN) where users store their own and friends’
information on their devices. Such an OSN can be a decentralized OSN like that in [1],
where no single server has information about all users, and two users can communicate
via the Internet to establish a friendship. It can also be an MSN where two users’ in
close proximity can utilize bluetooth or WiFi to communicate for private matching. In
addition, the network considered herein also includes the scenarios in centralized OSNs
like Facebook, Google+, where users may not always be connected to the servers and
can use the information stored in their mobile devices to fnd friends without the servers’
involvement.
Note that we consider social friendships bidirectional, mutual, and reciprocating. In
other words, if A is a friend of B’s, B is also a friend of A’s. Besides, we notice that in real
life people value their friendships differently. Thus, as shown in Figure 2.1, we propose that
each user groups his/her friends into different friend circles like hometown friends, family
friends, university friends, co-workers, and gym friends. In addition, we consider that each
user i is affliated with a set of communities, denoted by Ci = {Ci1 , Ci2 , ..., Cici }. The
whole set of communities a user i or his/her friends are affliated with, called “the overall
community set” of user i and denoted by C i , is C i =
12

S

j∈N i

Cj , where N i = Ni ∪ {i} and

Figure 2.1
System Model
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Ni denotes the set of user i’s friends. We call a community in C i one of user i’s overall
communities.

2.3.2

Asymmetric Distributed Social Proximity Measurement

In order to measure the social proximity (denoted by Ψ) between two users in an OSN
without revealing their privacy, we utilize the users’ overall community sets instead of
their private profles. The intuition behind this is that two persons who both have a lot of
close friends in the same several communities can probably be friends. In particular, we
take the following parameters into account. First, as mentioned before, a user in an OSN
divides his/her friends into different friend circles, which represent different friendship
weights to the user. In particular, suppose a user i has a set of friend circles F Ci =
{F Ci1 , F Ci2 , ..., F Cifi }. In order to quantify the signifcance of a particular friend circle
F Cij (1 ≤ j ≤ fi ), user i assigns an integer value αij (0 ≤ αij ≤ αmax ) to F Cij . A larger
αij indicates higher importance of the friend circle to the user. Second, each user, say i,
also assigns an integer weight factor to each of the communities he/she is affliated with,
say Cij (1 ≤ j ≤ ci ), which is denoted by βi (Cij ) (0 ≤ βij ≤ β max ). Note that αmax and
β max are predefned system parameters (integers) that are known to all the users.
Considering the above parameters, we defne a community based social proximity becAB
1
2
, CAB
, ..., CAB
}, and
tween two users A and B as follows. Let CAB = C A ∩ C B = {CAB

F C(i, j) denote a function which returns user i’s friend circle(s) that i’s friend, j, is in,
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i.e., j ∈ F Cik for any k ∈ F C(i, j). Besides, we defne F C(i, i) = {0} for any i, and
αj0 = αmax for any j. Thus, the social proximity between A and B gauged by A is
|CAB |

X
ΨA←B =


i
βj (CAB
)

X

i=1 j∈C i ∩N A
AB
|C A |

X

X

X

k
αA



{k|k∈F C(A,j)}


βj (CAi )

i=1 j∈C i ∩N A
A

X

k
αA

,

(2.1)

,

(2.2)



{k|k∈F C(A,j)}

and that gauged by B is
|CAB |

X
ΨB←A =

X


i
βj (CAB
)

i=1 j∈C i ∩N B
AB
|C B |

X

X

X

k
αB



{k|k∈F C(B,j)}


βj (CBi )

i=1 j∈C i ∩N B
B

X

k
αB



{k|k∈F C(B,j)}

where 0 ≤ ΨA←B ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ ΨB←A ≤ 1. Evidently, the social proximity measures defned above are rational numbers. In (2.1),

P

{k|k∈F C(A,j)}

k
is the total weight of friend j
αA

i
to A considering the multiple friend circles of A that j is in. βj (CAB
) is the weight of one
i
of the common communities, i.e., CAB
, shared by A and B to j. Thus, the numerator of the

right-hand-side (RHS) of (2.1) represents the total equivalent weight of the common communities shared by A and B to A, considering both A’s and A’s friends’ perceptions. Similarly, the denominator of the right-hand-side (RHS) of (2.1) represents the total equivalent
weight of A’s communities to A, considering both A’s and A’s friends’ perceptions. Thus,
(2.1) is the normalized weight of the common communities to A considering both A’s and
A’s friends’ perceptions. In other words, (2.1) quantifes how important the common communities are to A. Similarly, (2.2) is the normalized weight of the common communities
to B considering both B’s and B’s friends’ perceptions and quantifes how important the
common communities are to B. Notice that when calculating ΨA←B , A only needs his/her
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weights on his/her own friend circles and his/her friends’ weights on As communities. In
general, a larger ΨA←B indicates a closer social relationship of B to A.
Note that the proposed social proximity measurement is asymmetric, i.e., ΨA←B and
ΨB←A are not necessarily equal. This is different from most of the distributed proximity measurements proposed for private matching, which are symmetric. We contend that
asymmetric social proximity is more realistic, which is supported by a common intuition
that the fact that A is the best friend of B does not necessarily mean B is the best friend of
A.

2.3.3

Cryptographic Tools

2.3.3.1

Paillier Cryptosystem

Paillier designed an effcient asymmetric cryptosystem, called Paillier cryptosystem
[60], based on decisional composite residuosity assumption. Due to its attractive additive
homomorphic property, Paillier cryptosystem has been widely used in many applications
like secure e-voting and private information retrieval. In particular, letting ENC(·) and
DEC(·) denote the encryption and decryption functions of Paillier scheme, respectively,
we have
• ENC(m1 ) · ENC(m2 ) = ENC(m1 + m2 )
• ENC(m)c = ENC(c · m)

The Paillier cryptosystem is semantically secure for suffciently large public keys, which
means that it is infeasible for a computationally bounded adversary to derive signifcant information about a message (plaintext) when given only its ciphertext and the corresponding
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public key. In this study, we assume that the public key is of 1184 bits for suffcient semantical security of the Paillier cryptosystem [75]. Therefore, a ciphertext is of 2048 bits,
a Paillier encryption needs two 1024-bit exponentiations and one 2048-bit multiplication,
and a Paillier decryption’s cost is equivalent to one 2048-bit exponentiation.
Note that the proposed protocols can in fact work with any cryptosystem which is semantically secure and supports additive homomorphism. We employ Paillier cryptosystem
to facilitate our illustrations in this work.

2.3.3.2

The FNP Scheme

Freedman et al. [28] design a private matching and set intersection protocol, called
FNP, using homomorphic encryption, on which our protocols are based. In FNP, a client
constructs a polynomial P (z) = (x1 − z)(x2 − z).......(xnC − z) =

PnC

k=0

uk z k , where

x1 , x2 , ..., xnC are the elements of the client’s input set X. The client then encrypts the coeffcients and send ENC(u0 ), ENC(u1 ), ..., ENC(unc ) to the server. Utilizing the homomorphic property, the server constructs and evaluates the encrypted polynomial ENC(P (z)) at
each of the element in its own input set Y . The server then chooses a random number ρi ,
and computes and returns to the client ENC(ρi P (yi )+yi ) for each yi ∈ Y . When the client
decrypts the ciphertext received from the server, it can fnd all yi ∈ X ∩ Y as P (y) = 0 for
all yi ’s which are the roots of the polynomial P (z) constructed by the client.

2.3.4

Adversary Model

Although there could be outsider adversaries trying to eavesdrop on the communications in the OSN, or modify, replay and inject messages, we focus on insider adversaries
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in our protocol design, who are the participators of the protocols and pose more challenges
in protecting users’ privacy. We believe, in the context of social networks, semi-honest
or Honest But Curious (HBC) adversary model best describes the characteristics of adversaries, which is considered as the adversary model in this study. A semi-honest adversary
faithfully executes the protocols correctly but at the same time tries to gather more information about the other party than the protocols intend to disseminate.

2.4

Asymmetric Social Proximity Based Private Matching Protocols
In this section, we propose three novel and effcient social proximity based private

matching protocols with different privacy levels. Before we delve into details, we frst
present some defnitions below.
• Initiator2 : An Initiator is an OSN user who initiates a protocol for calculating social
proximity. In other words, an Initiator is an OSN user who asks another user (a
Responder) for friendship.
• Responder: A Responder, upon the the request from an Initiator, replies by following the protocol.

Besides, when an Initiator asks a Responder for friendship, it should be the Responder
who determines whether or not to accept the request by executing the protocol to fnd the
social proximity.

2.4.1

Protocol for Level 1 Privacy (L1P)

The protocol ensuring level 1 privacy is suitable for users who decide to make friends
with each other simply based on the common communities of their overall community
2

Without loss of generality, we use masculine pronouns for an Initiator and feminine pronouns for a
Responder.
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Figure 2.2
Protocol Descriptions (Initiator) of Level 1 Privacy (L1P)
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Figure 2.3
Protocol Descriptions (Responder) of Level 1 Privacy (L1P)
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sets. In this protocol, we frst let the Responder learn the mutual communities and the size
of the Initiator’s input set (C I ) (i.e., the Initiator’s overall community set), while let the
Initiator learn nothing but the size of the Responder’s input set (C R ) (i.e., the Responder’s
overall community set). Then, the Responder securely sends the common communities to
the Initiator, if she confrms the request from the Initiator.

2.4.1.1

Protocol Details

We divide the protocol in two stages: offine and online. In order to speed up the
matching process, the Initiator executes part of the protocol offine. In particular, the Initiator uses his input set C I to construct the following polynomial:
P (z) =

1
(C I

−

2
z)(C I

−

|C I |
z).......(C I

− z) =

|C I |
X

uk z k

(2.3)

k=0
i

where C I ∈ C I (1 ≤ i ≤ |C I |). He then encrypts the coeffcients uk ’s of the polynomial and obtains ENCI (u0 ), ENCI (u1 ), ..., ENCI (u|C I | ), where ENCI (·) is the Initiator’s
homomorphic encryption function.
As shown in Figure 2.2, in the online stage, the Initiator frst sends the encrypted coeffcients along with his public key to the Responder. The Responder subsequently constructs
(Figure 2.3) the encrypted polynomial based on the encrypted coeffcients utilizing the
homomorphic property, i.e.,
0

1

ENCI (P (z)) = ENCI (u0 )z · ENCI (u1 )z ·
.... · ENCI (u|C I | )z
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|C I |

.

(2.4)

The Responder then evaluates ENCI (P (z)) at each of her own input element, computes
the following function, and sends it along with her public key to the Initiator:
i

i

ENCI (P (C R ) + Ri ) = ENCI (P (C R )) · ENCI (Ri )

(2.5)

where Ri is a random ID generated by the Responder for the community corresponding to
i

i

C R , and of the same length as P (C R ). Then, in the second step, the two parties engage
in a challenge response protocol to establish a shared secret key. In particular, the Initiator
chooses a random nonce K as the key for a predefned symmetric encryption function
E(·) (e.g., AES), encrypts it with the Responder’s public key, and sends EN CR (K) to the
Responder, where EN CR (·) is the Responder’s homomorphic encryption function. The
Responder recovers K and acknowledges with EN CI (K + 1) to the Initiator. Both parties
use K as the shared secret key in the third step. Finally, in the third step, the Initiator
i

decrypts the data received from the Responder in the frst step, i.e., ENCI (P (C R ) + Ri )’s,
encrypts the decrypted data with the symmetric key K using the symmetric encryption
�

�

i
i
algorithm EK (·), and then sends EK DECI (EN CI (C R ) + Ri )) = EK P (C R ) + Ri
i

i

back to the Responder. Note that P (C R ) = 0 when the corresponding community C R is
a mutual community between the Initiator’s and the Responder’s overall community sets.
i

Thus, after recovering P (C R ) + Ri , the Responder can know the mutual communities by
checking Ri ’s. If she does not want to make friends with the Initiator, she can either ignore
or decline the request. Otherwise, she encrypts the mutual communities with the shared
secret K and sends EK (C I ∩C R ) to the Initiator, who can now fnd the shared communities.
If he would like to continue, he can fnally become friends with the Responder. Note that
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to prevent some Initiators from possibly knowing some of the Responder’s communities
i

by colluding with each other, the Responder generates a new Ri corresponding to C R upon
each friendship request.

2.4.1.2

Protocol Analysis

In the following, we analyze the privacy of, and the communication cost and computation cost of the protocol.
Following theorem presents the Privacy Analysis of the L1P protocol.
Theorem 1
Before they become friends, the Initiator only learns |C R |, and C I ∩ C R if the Responder
confrms his request, while the Responder only learns |C I | and C I ∩ C R .
Proof: The Initiator uses semantically secure homomorphic encryption to encrypt the coeffcients of the polynomial P , whose roots are the elements of his input set C I . The
Responder cannot decrypt or distinguish the coeffcients, and hence cannot know C I but
i

can learn |C I |. Following the protocol, the Responder then sends ENCI (P (C R ) + Ri )’s
i

back to the Initiator, where Ri ’s are random numbers of the same length as P (C R )’s. Thus,
i

the Initiator can only learn |C R | but nothing more. After receiving P (C R ) + Ri from the
Initiator, the Responder will be able to fgure out C I ∩ C R , and let the Initiator know as
well if she decides to confrm the request. Otherwise, the protocol terminates and both
parties do not know anything further about each other.
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The total Computation and Communication Costs in this protocol can be analyzed
similar to those in [28]. Differently, in the proposed L1P, the Initiator executes part of the
protocol offine which in turn reduces the online computation cost. Specifcally, the Initiator, in the offine stage, computes the polynomial P (z) and encrypts its coeffcients with
his public key. As the computational complexity of the exponentiation operation dominates
the other operations like multiplication and addition, we analyze the computation overhead
focusing on exponentiation operations. Recall that the input set size of the Initiator and of
the Responder are |C I | and |C R | respectively, the offine computation cost of the Initiator
is O(|C I |) exponentiations. In the online stage, the Initiator’s computation cost is O(|C R |)
i

due to decrypting ENCI (P (C R ) + Ri )’s received from the Responder. The Responder’s
computation cost for constructing the encrypted polynomial and evaluating at each of her
inputs is O(|C R | log log |C I |) exponentiations, considering that the polynomial can be effciently evaluated by Hornor’s rule and the balanced bucket allocation scheme presented
in [28].
Regarding the communication cost, the Initiator frst transmits O(|C I |) encrypted coeffcients and the Responder returns O(|C R |) ciphertexts to the Initiator. Subsequently, in
the next step, the Initiator returns O(|C R |) decrypted messages and the Responder returns
O(|C I ∩ C R |) common communities. Thus, the total communication cost for the Initiator
is O(|C I | + |C R |) and that for the Responder is O(|C R | + |C I ∩ C R |).
Moreover, the L1P protocol allows parallel processing in communication and computation which can further reduce the online execution time. In particular, the Responder does
not have to wait for all the coeffcients before beginning the computation of the encrypted
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polynomial. Similarly, when she starts returning the evaluated encrypted polynomial at
each of her input, the Initiator can start decrypting the ciphertexts as soon as he receives
one. Hence, if the communication cost is equal to or greater than the online computation
overhead in time, the total communication cost would approximately be the total execution
time of the protocol.

2.4.2

Protocol for Level 2 Privacy (L2P)

In the protocol for level 1 privacy (L1P), the Responder determines whether or not to
accept the Initiator’s request for a social friendship only based on their common overall
communities, which may not characterize the social proximity well. In this section, we
design a protocol for level 2 privacy, called L2P, utilizing the proposed community based
asymmetric social proximity measurement. This protocol is suitable for the case when the
Initiator is willing to establish a friendship relation with the Responder but the Responder
accepts the relationship only if her requirement on the friendship is fulflled. In particular,
in L2P, the Responder accepts the friendship request from the Initiator if the social proximity measured by her, i.e, ΨR←I , is greater than a threshold predefned by herself, denoted
by ΨRτ . The protocol is detailed as follows.

2.4.2.1

Protocol Details

Similar to that in L1P, an Initiator and a Responder can execute part of the protocol
offine in order to speed up the matching process.
In the OFFLINE phase, the same as that in L1P, the Initiator constructs the polynomial
1

2

|C I |

P , with his inputs C I = {C I , C I , ...C I

} being the roots, and encrypts the coeffcients
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using his own homomorphic encryption function ENCI (·). On the other hand, the Responder calculates the partial social proximity corresponding to each of her overall communities
as follows:
X


i
βj (C R )

i

ΨiR←I =

j∈C R ∩N R
|C R |

X

X

i=1 j∈C i ∩N
R
R

X

k
αR



{k|k∈F C(R,j)}

(2.6)

i
βj (C R )

X

k
αR



{k|k∈F C(R,j)}

i

for any C R ∈ C R (1 ≤ i ≤ |C R |). The Responder needs to encrypt the partial social proxi

imity for all C R ’s with her public key. However, ΨiR←I is a fractional number and general
additive homomorphic schemes cannot be used to encrypt the fractional numbers. Note
that since α’s and β’s are integers, ΨiR←I is a rational number. Besides, the denominator
i

in (2.6) is a constant for all C R ∈ C R . We denote the denominator by DR . The Responder
encrypts the numerator (integer) of the partial social proximity with her public key, i.e.,
computes ENCR (ΨiR←I · DR ), where ENCR (·) is her homomorphic encryption function.
In addition, the Responder assigns a random ID, Ri , to each of her overall communities
upon each friendship request.
In the ONLINE phase, i.e., when an Initiator and a Responder decide to execute the
protocol, the Initiator frst sends the encrypted coeffcients of the polynomial P to the Responder. Note that the Initiator and the Responder exchange their public keys to establish
a shared secret key K in the same way as that in L1P, which is also shown in Figure 2.4,
Figure 2.5. The detailed description of shared key establishment is omitted below to avoid
redundancy. The Responder then constructs the encrypted polynomial according to (2.4),
i

and evaluates the polynomial at each of her input C R ∈ C R . Taking advantage of the
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homomorphic property of the encryption, the Responder further constructs the following
message

i
(Ai , Bi , Ci )= ENCI (ρi · P (C R )),
ENCI



i
P (C R )

+

(2.7)

ENCR (ΨiR←I



· DR ) , Ri

i

for each C R ∈ C R , where ρi is a random number of the same length as P (yi ), and sends
(Ai , Bi , Ci ) to the Initiator.
The Initiator then decrypts Ai , and for each i with DECI (Ai ) = 0, calculates DECI (Bi ) =
(0 + ENCR (ΨiR←I ) · DR ) = ENCR (ΨiR←I · DR ), which implies the corresponding input
i

C R ∈ (C I ∩ C R ). After that, the Initiator can calculate the encrypted social proximity for
the Responder by aggregating all Bi ’s as follows:
ENCR (ΨR←I · D)
=

Y

DECI (Bi )

{i|DECI (Ai )=0}

=



Y

ENCR

X

�

i

βj (C R ) ·

i

{i|DECI (Ai )=0}

j∈C R ∩N R

X

k
αR




{k|k∈F C(R,j)}

= ENCR

|X
CIR |

X

i=1 j∈C i ∩N
R
R

= ENCR (ΨR←I · DR )

�
i
βj (C R )

X

k
αR





{k|k∈F C(R,j)}

(2.8)

Obviously, we can see that when Ai = 0, the term Bi gives the numerator of the encrypted
(by the Responder) partial social proximity attributed to the community CRi that is common
to both the Initiator and the Responder. Thus, due to homomorphic property, the product
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Figure 2.4
Protocol Descriptions (Initiator) of Extended Level 2 Privacy (EL2P).
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Figure 2.5
Protocol Descriptions (Responder) of Extended Level 2 Privacy (EL2P).
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of the encryption over all the communities with Ai = 0 is equal to the encryption of the
sum of the partial social proximities attributed to all the common communities shared by
the Initiator and the Responder, as shown in (2.8). As is evident from (2.2), (2.8) is in fact
the encrypted (by the Responder) social proximity between the Responder and the Initiator
gauged by the Responder times DR , i.e., EN CR (ΨR←I · DR ).
The Initiator sends ENCR (ΨR←I · DR ) to the Responder, who decrypts it and checks
to see if ΨR←I · DR ≥ ΨRτ · DR , i.e. ΨR←I ≥ ΨRτ . If not, the Responder aborts
the protocol and informs the Initiator. Otherwise, the Responder confrms the Initiator’s
request, who then encrypts the Ri ’s, corresponding to the cases when DECI (Ai ) = 0, with
the symmetric key K and sends EK (Ri )’s to the Responder. After decrypting EK (Ri ), the
Responder can then know C I ∩ C R and sends EK (C I ∩ C R ) back to the Initiator, who can
now become friends with the Responder if he still would like to proceed.

2.4.2.2

Extended Protocol for Level 2 Privacy (EL2P)

In the above L2P protocol, it is possible that the Responder may learn more than just
the social proximity ΨR←I when receiving ΨR←I · DR and hence ΨR←I (the Responder
knows DR ) from the Initiator. For example, if there happens to be only one common
community between the Initiator and the Responder, then it is possible for the Responder
to fnd out the common community by looking at the partial social proximity ΨiR←I value
of each of her communities even if ΨR←I 6≥ ΨRτ . Similarly, even if there are multiple
common communities shared by the Initiator and the Responder, the Responder may learn
the common communities by checking if the sum of several partial social proximity is
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equal to ΨR←I received from the Initiator. Here, we extend the L2P protocol so that the
Responder only learns whether ΨR←I ≥ ΨRτ + /DR , where  is a small number such
that   ΨRτ , instead of the value of ΨR←I . The detailed process of EL2P is described in
Figure 2.4 for the Initiator and Figure 2.5 for the Responder.
Specifcally, at the end of step 1) of the online phase, the Responder sends ENCR (ΨRτ ·
DR ) in addition to (Ai , Bi , Ci ) to the Initiator. The Initiator then computes ENCR (ΨR←I ·
DR ) according to (2.8), and chooses three large positive random numbers r1 , r2 , and r3
such that 0  r1 < r2 < r3 and  <

r2 −r1
r3

 Ψmin , where Ψmin is a predefned minimum

social proximity threshold and known to all the users. Note that
(r1 + r3 (ΨR←I · DR )) ≥ (r3 (ΨRτ · DR ) + r2 )


(r2 − r1 )/r3
=⇒ ΨR←I ≥ ΨRτ +
DR
=⇒ ΨR←I ≥ ΨRτ + /DR

(2.9)

�
Therefore, the Initiator can compute (M, N ) = ENCR (r1 +r3 (ΨR←I ·DR )), ENCR (r3 (ΨRτ ·

DR ) + r2 ) as follows
ENCR (r1 + r3 (ΨR←I · DR ))
= ENCR (r1 ) · ENCR (ΨR←I · DR )r3
ENCR (r3 (ΨRτ · DR ) + r2 )
= ENCR (ΨRτ · DR )r3 · ENCR (r2 )

(2.10)

and sends (M, N ) back to the Responder (instead of sending ENCR (ΨR←I · DR ) to her).
The Responder then checks to see if DECR (M ) ≥ DECR (N ) and follows the rest of the
protocol accordingly in the same way as presented above.
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We can see that in this extended protocol EL2P, the Responder is only able to learn if
ΨR←I ≥ ΨRτ + /DR , i.e., ΨR←I > ΨRτ (since /DR  Ψmin /DR  ΨRτ ), and the
above problem can be addressed.

2.4.2.3

Protocol Analysis

In the following we analyze the EL2P protocol in terms of privacy, and computation
and communication cost.
The following theorem presents Privacy Analysis of EL2P protocol.
Theorem 2
Before they become friends, the Initiator learns only |C R | and |C I ∩ C R |, and the mutual
communities C I ∩ C R if ΨR←I > ΨRτ , while the Responder learns only |C I |, and the
mutual communities C I ∩ C R if ΨR←I > ΨRτ .
Proof: The Initiator uses semantically secure homomorphic encryption to encrypt the coeffcients of the polynomial P , whose roots are the elements of his input set C I . The
Responder cannot decrypt or distinguish the coeffcients, and hence cannot know C I but
can learn |C I |. Following the protocol, the Responder then sends (Ai , Bi , Ci )’s to the Initiator, who can then know |C R |. By decrypting (Ai , Bi , Ci )’s and counting all Ai ’s that are
decrypted to be 0, the Initiator can then know the size of the mutual community set, i.e.,
|C I ∩ C R |, but does not know which the mutual communities are. He then computes the
tuple (M, N ), and sends it to the Responder. If the Responder fnds ΨR←I > ΨRτ , she
informs the Initiator who sends her the random IDs Ri ’s, and hence can know the mutual
communities C I ∩ C R . Otherwise, the protocol terminates and both parties do not know
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anything further about each other. Besides, similarly to that in Theorem 1, the Initiator and
the Responder cannot know all the communities in each other’s overall community set by
artifcially extending their input sets.
Moreover, one may argue that it is possible for the Initiator to cheat by increasing
M , for example, computing M 0 = M · ENCR (r4 ) where r4 > 0 or M 0 = M r4 where
r4 > 1, so that the Responder will get DECR (M ) > DECR (N ) and hence accepts his
request. However, the Initiator will always be caught since the Responder can verify in
step 3) of the online phase whether or not ΨR←I > ΨRτ by checking the received Ri ’s
from the Initiator before revealing C I ∩ C R to the Initiator. Without receiving the mutual
communities, the Initiator cannot fnally be authorized to make friends with the Responder.

The Computation and Communication Costs of the protocol are calculated as follows. The Initiator and the Responder execute part of the protocol offine, as in L1P, which
can reduce the online computation time. In particular, in the offine phase, the Initiator
incurs O(|C I |) exponentiations to compute the encrypted coeffcients of P (z). Similarly,
the Responder has a computation load of O(|C R |) exponentiations to compute the partial social proximity offine. In the online phase, the computation cost for the Initiator is
O(|C R |) exponentiations (in step 2) of the online phase as shown in Figure 2.4). The Responder performs O(|C R | log log |C I |) exponentiations (Figure 2.5) in step 1) of the online
phase.
As for the communication cost, the Initiator sends O(|C I |) encrypted coeffcients in
step 1) and O(|C I ∩ C R |) IDs (Ri ’s) in step 3) of the protocol. The Responder, on the other
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hand, replies with O(|C R |) encrypted ciphertexts in step 1) and O(|C I ∩C R |) communities
in step 3). Thus, the total communication overhead for the Initiator is O(|C I | + |C I ∩ C R |)
and that for the Responder is O(|C R | + |C I ∩ C R |).

2.4.3

Protocol for Level 3 Privacy

In the L2P protocol, the Responder determines whether or not to be friends with the
Initiator based on the community based social proximity, while the Initiator still can only
make his fnal decision based on their common communities. Besides, in terms of privacy,
in L2P the Responder will know C I ∩ C R if ΨR←I > ΨRτ , no matter whether the social
proximity measured by the Initiator is large enough or not. In this section, we develop a
protocol for level 3 privacy, called L3P, to address the above problems. This protocol is
suitable for users with very high privacy requirements. In this protocol, both the Initiator
and the Responder make sure their requirements on friendship are fulflled before revealing
any matching information to each other. If either of the requirements is not satisfed, neither
of them knows the matching profle information, i.e., the common communities C I ∩ C R .

2.4.3.1

Protocol Description

The same as that in L1P and L2P, part of the L3P protocol can be completed offine. In
what follows, we briefy describe the offine and online phases of the protocol, respectively,
which are also shown in Figure 2.6 for the Initiator and Figure 2.7 for the Responder.
In the OFFLINE phase, the Initiator constructs a polynomial P with his input set C I
being the roots, while the Responder constructs a polynomial Q with her input set C R
being the roots (step 1)). Each of them encrypts the coeffcients of their polynomials using
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Figure 2.6
Protocol Descriptions (Initiator) of Level 3 Privacy (L3P).
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Figure 2.7
Protocol Descriptions (Responder) of Level 3 Privacy (L3P).
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their own public keys in step 2), and computes partial community based social proximities
in step 3).
In the ONLINE, the Initiator and the Responder exchange their encrypted coeffcients
in step 1). The Initiator and the Responder construct ENCR (Q(z)) and ENCI (P (z)), respectively, based on the received ciphertexts, and evaluate at each of their own inputs, and
exchange their tuples (A0i , Bi0 ) and (Ai , Bi ), i.e.,
�

i

i

i
ENCR (ρ0i · P (C I )), ENCR (ρi0 · P (C I ) + ENCI (ΨI←R
· DI )



�

i
i
ENCI (ρi · P (C R )), ENCI (ρi · P (C R ) + ENCR (ΨiR←I · DR )
along with ENCI (ΨIτ · DI ) and ENCR (ΨRτ · DR ), respectively, in step 2). Note that ρ0i
and ρi are random numbers of the same length as P (·), Similar to that in step 2) of the L2P
online phase, the Initiator and the Responder exchange the tuples (M 0 , N 0 ) and (M, N ) in
step 3), i.e.,
(ENCR (r10 + r30 (ΨR←I · DR )), ENCR (r30 (ΨRτ · DR ) + r10 ))
(ENCI (r1 + r3 (ΨI←R · DI )), ENCI (r3 (ΨIτ · DI ) + r1 )).
where 0  r10 < r20 < r30 and  <
r2 −r1
r3

r20 −r10
r30

 Ψmin , and 0  r1 < r2 < r3 and  <

 Ψmin . If at least one of the social proximity criteria is not satisfed, i.e., if ΨI←R 

ΨIτ or/and ΨR←I  ΨRτ , they cannot become friends and the protocol stops at step 4)
before either of them is able to learn any matching information. Otherwise, i.e., if ΨI←R >
ΨIτ and ΨR←I > ΨRτ both hold, the Initiator and the Responder are both assumed to be
willing to establish a social friendship and they can become friends now.
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2.4.3.2

Protocol Analysis

Next, we present the analysis on the privacy, and computation and communication cost
of the L3P protocol.
The following theorem presents Privacy Analysis of the L3P protocol.
Theorem 3
Before they become friends, the Initiator learns |C R | and |C I ∩ C R |, while the Responder
learns |C I | and |C I ∩ C R |.
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Theorem 2 and hence omitted here.
Moreover, in most previous schemes, e.g., [16, 22, 46, 47, 50, 53, 75], a user can request
friendship with another user, run some protocols, and then leave with the user’s private
information before the user can know anything. In our schemes, as shown in Theorems
1-3, when one user requests friendship with another, he/she can know some of the user’s
important private information only if the user is willing to accept the request.
The Computation and Communication Costs of the protocol is analyzed in the following. A signifcant fraction of the computation in L3P can be done offine. In particular,
as shown in Figure 2.6, the Initiator performs (|C I | + 1) encryptions on the coeffcients
of the polynomial P (z) and also computes |C I | encryptions on partial social proximity
measurements. Thus, the Initiator’s total offine computation complexity is O(|C I |) exponentiations. Similarly, the Responder’s total offine computation complexity, as shown in
Figure 2.7, is O(|C R |) exponentiations. In the online phase, following the similar analysis
to that of the previous two protocols, the Initiator’s computation complexity in step 2) is
O(|C I | log log |C R |) exponentiations and that in step 3) is O(|C R |) exponentiations. The
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Figure 2.8
Facebook Ego-Network of ‘A’
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Responder’s computation complexity is O(|C R | log log |C I |) and O(|C I |) exponentiations
in step 2) and step 3), respectively.
Moreover, the Initiator’s communication cost is O(|C I |) and O(|C R |) in step 1) and
step 2), respectively. Similarly, the Responder’s communication cost is O(|C R |) and
O(|C I |) in step 1) and step 2), respectively. Therefore, both the Initiator and the Responder have a total communication cost of O(|C R | + |C I |). In addition, as mentioned
before, some computation and communication can be done in parallel, thus reducing the
overall protocol execution time.

2.5

Performance Evaluation

Figure 2.9
Calculated Proximity between A and A’s friends using Three different Metrics
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2.5.1

Asymmetric Social Proximity Measure Validation

In Section 2.3.2, we propose an asymmetric social proximity metric between two users,
which is based on each user’s as well as his/her friends’ perceptions on the common communities between the two users. In this section, we design an experiment to validate the
proposed metric using one author’s (whom we denote by A) Facebook ego-network as
shown in Figure 2.8. The ego-network has 556 nodes (A’s friends) and 7856 edges (interconnections among A’s friends). The degree of each node in the network gives the number
of common friends between A and the node (A’s friend). Note that A is not in the network.
In order to quantify the proximity between A and any of his friends according to the
asymmetric proximity metric proposed in this work, A divides his friends into the following six friend circles: F CA = {F CA1 , F CA2 , F CA3 , F CA4 , F CA5 , F CA6 } = {Friends from
hometown, Friends in the current university, Friends from the previous university, Job 1
friends, Job 2 friends, Others}3 . Starting clockwise from the large cluster in the lower
right in Figure 2.8, the clusters correspond to F CA1 to F CA5 respectively. We look at
each node (A’s friend) in the network, and associate it with one or more communities
according to its current and previous locations, occupations, academic institutions, etc.
For example, a node V in the network can be a member of city Ti and city Tj communities, the ECE department of university Ui community, and the organization Oi community. The values of α and β are set from 0 to 10. In this experiment, A assigns
3

Interestingly, the different clusters in the ego-network as shown in Fig. 2.8 approximately represent
these different friend circles of A (except “Others”). This opens up the possibility of automating the process
of dividing one’s friends into different friend circles. The weights on the friend circles can be estimated
automatically, e.g., based on the number of friends in them, and fnally confrmed by the user. The weights
on the communities can be estimated similarly.
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1
2
3
4
6
5
αA
= 10, αA
= 9, αA
= 9, αA
= 7, αA
= 5, and αA
= 2. Besides, for all V ∈ N A

and CVj ∈ CV , we have βV (CVj ) = 10 if |CVj | ≥ 50, and βV (CVj ) = 5 otherwise.
Figure 2.5 shows the social proximity values computed based on the normalized number of common friends, the normalized number of common profle attributes, and the asymmetric proximity metric proposed in this work for each of the 556 nodes (friends of A) in
the network. In particular, the normalized number of common friends is calculated as the
number of common friends between A and one of A’s friends divided by the total number of possible common friends, i.e., 556, in this case. Similarly, the number of common
profle attributes (i.e., communities here) is normalized regarding the total number of profle attributes (communities) of A, i.e., |CA |. We contend that compared to the other two
metrics, the proposed asymmetric proximity measure can better describe the friendship
valuations. In the following, we choose four nodes (W, X, Y, Z) to compare these three
metrics in detail.
Specifcally, the normalized number of common friends cannot fully differentiate the
importance of friends. For example, Z and X share approximately the same number of
friends with A, and their normalized numbers of common friends with A are 0.11 and
0.13, respectively. In contrast, the proposed asymmetric proximity of Z is nearly twice as
much as that of X (ΨA←Z = 0.39, ΨA←X = 0.20), since Z shares two communities with A
and belongs to two different friend circles F CA1 , F CA2 while X only shares one community
with A and belongs to only one friend circle F CA1 . The higher social proximity value of
Z is justifed from the network theory perspective. Particularly, the ratio of betweenness
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centrality4 of Z to that of X is 5.5 : 1, which emphasizes the relative importance of node
Z over X.
Similarly, the normalized number of common attributes fails to well differentiate the
importance of friends as well. In our experiment, as shown in Figure 2.5, most nodes
have the same normalized number of common attributes, and hence cannot be differentiated based on this metric. More importantly, it also fails to fully establish friendships
whenever possible. For example, many of A’s friends do not have any common attributes
with A and hence their normalized numbers of common attributes are 0. On the other
hand, the proposed asymmetric proximity measure gives non-zero values as those friends
share attributes with some other friends of A. The experiment confrms our argument in
the beginning that whether two people can become friends not only depends on whether
they have anything (attributes) in common, but also depends on whether their friends have
anything in common.
To give another example, friends W and Y have the same normalized number of common friends (0.2) and the same number of common attributes (0). In contrast, the proposed asymmetric proximity measure is able to differentiate these two friends, i.e., 0.18
and 0.11, respectively, as they are associated with different communities and belong to
different friend circles with different sizes and weights.
Moreover, we conduct similar experiments on ego-networks of Z, and fnd that ΨZ←A =
0.46 which is larger than ΨA←Z , i.e., 0.39, as shown above. Apparently, Z values friend4

Betweenness centrality is a measure of a node’s centrality in a network [29]. The betweenness centrality
of a node v in a network is equal to the number of shortest paths from all nodes to all others that pass through
node v.
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ship with A more than A does to friendship with Z. This is because the size overall
community set of A is about 15 percent larger than that of Z (|C A | = 192, |C Z | = 165).
Besides, A shares two communities with Z and is in to two of the total four different friend
circles of Z, whereas Z is in two of the six friend circles of A. This demonstrates the
asymmetric characteristics of friendships captured by our proximity measure.

Figure 2.10
Comparison of total Computation Cost

2.5.2

Private Matching Protocols’ Performance Evaluation

In this section, we evaluate the proposed protocols’ performances in terms of computation cost, communication overhead, total running time, and energy cost, and compare them
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Figure 2.11
Comparison of total Communication Cost
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Figure 2.12
Comparison of total Protocol Execution Time
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Figure 2.13
Comparison of total Energy Cost

with the performances of the protocols developed in [75] and [50]. In particular, Zhang et
al. [75] present fne-grained private matching protocols using an additively separable function like l1 norm. [75] defnes d as the size of the public profle attribute set, which is the
set of all possible profle attributes in an OSN. To conduct fair comparisons, we set the size
of a user’s overall community set equal to d in our proposed protocols. Another parameter
γ in [75] denotes the range of the integer used to defne a user’s level of interest in a particular attribute in the public attribute set. For a reasonably fne-grade private matching,
we consider γ = 10. Besides, [75] presents four protocols with comparable computation
and communication complexity. We compare our protocols with their most effcient one:
Protocol 1. Besides, Lin et. al [50] propose a privacy preserving friend searching protocol
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where a user seeks to be introduced to another user’s friends with certain attributes. We
set attribute size m = γ = 10 and the number of friends equal to d for fair comparisons.
The parameters for the elliptic curve cryptography in [50] are the same as those used in
their paper, i.e. we use type D curve of the form y 2 = x3 + ax + b and the base feld is
represented by 160 bits.

Figure 2.14
Comparison of the total Computation Cost of the Initiator

We have implemented our proposed protocols using a Java implementation of Paillier’s
cryptosystem [52]. We carry out simulations on a notebook with an Intel Core 2 Duo CPU
and 2GB RAM. In the simulations, the same as that in [75], we focus on two wireless nodes
communicating with each other, which both use IEEE 802.11 DCF as the MAC protocol
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Figure 2.15
Comparison of the total Computation Cost of the Responder
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Figure 2.16
Comparison of the total Communication Cost of the Initiator
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Figure 2.17
Comparison of the total Communication Cost of the Responder
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Figure 2.18
Comparison of the total Energy Cost of the Initiator

Figure 2.19
Comparison of the total Energy Cost of the Responder
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with a data rate of 2Mbps. Besides, the energy consumption analysis neglects the energy
consumed in computation and only considers the energy cost due to communications. In
particular, we follow the energy model in QualNet [2] and assume the Transmission: Reception: Idle energy consumption ratios are 1.57 : 1.14: 1 [49].
We conduct two sets of simulations in this study. In the frst simulation, we vary the
size of the overall community set/the public profle attribute set/the number of friends while
keeping the percentage of shared community constant at 10%, and γ, m at 10. For simplicity, we consider the Initiator and the Responder have the same overall community set
size. Figure 2.5.1 compares the total of online and offine computation cost 5 . We can
see that our most expensive protocol L3P has much lower computation cost than the most
effcient protocol, Protocol 1, of [75] and the protocol of [50]. The reason is that each
party in [75] needs to compute O(dγ) exponentiations which is very expensive. Similarly,
a larger number of ciphertexts due to Zero Knowledge Proof of Knowledge (ZKPoK) and
blind key extraction in [50] result in a higher computation complexity. As shown in Figure 2.5.1, the communication overhead in [75] and [50] increases faster than our protocols
when d/the number of friends increases. The communication cost of [50] is lower than that
of [75] because of the smaller size of ciphertexts. Figure 2.5.1 compares the total protocol
running time. Note that parallel processing between the communication and computation
is implemented whenever possible in the protocols. Besides, the total running time takes
into account the packet overheads at different layers. In addition, Figure 2.5.1 shows the
5

The parameters for Figure 2.10 to Figure 2.19 are: |C I | = |C R | = d = No. of friends, |C I ∩ C R | =
10% · |C I |(|C R |) and γ = m = 10. Similarly, the X-axis represents size of overall community set (|C I | =
|C R |), size of public profle attribute set (d), and No. of friends in the proposed protocols, [75], and [50]
respectively.
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energy consumption of the protocols. We can easily fnd that our protocols require less
running time and consume less energy than Protocol 1 in [75] and the protocol in [50]. We
further extend the frst experiment by breaking down the computation, communication, and
energy costs to those for the Initiator and those for the Responder as shown in Figure 2.5.2Figure 2.5.2. Note that the protocols in [75] and [50] need to run twice in order for both
the Initiator and the Responder to obtain the private matching results, and the cost for the
Initiator and that for the Responder are the same. We can see that both the Initiator and the
Responder are subject to lower costs in our protocols.
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Figure 2.20
Performance comparison with varying size of the percentage of the shared
communities|C I ∩ C R | (|C I | = |C R | = 200).
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Figure 2.21
Performance comparison with varying size of the percentage of the shared communities
|C I ∩ C R | (|C I | = |C R | = 200).
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Figure 2.22
Performance comparison with varying size of the percentage of the shared communities
|C I ∩ C R | (|C I | = |C R | = 200).
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Figure 2.23
Performance comparison with varying size of the percentage of the shared communities
|C I ∩ C R | (|C I | = |C R | = 200).
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Figure 2.24
Computation cost for the Initiator with varying size of the percentage of the shared
communities|C I ∩ C R | (|C I | = |C R | = 200).
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Figure 2.25
Computation cost for the Responder with varying size of the percentage of the shared
communities |C I ∩ C R | (|C I | = |C R | = 200).
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Figure 2.26
Communication cost for the Initiator with varying size of the percentage of the shared
communities |C I ∩ C R | (|C I | = |C R | = 200).
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Figure 2.27
Communication cost for the Responder with varying size of the percentage of the shared
communities|C I ∩ C R | (|C I | = |C R | = 200).
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Figure 2.28
Energy cost for the Initiator with varying size of the percentage of the shared
communities |C I ∩ C R | (|C I | = |C R | = 200).
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Figure 2.29
Energy cost for the Responder with varying size of the percentage of the shared
communities |C I ∩ C R | (|C I | = |C R | = 200).
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In the second set of simulations, we analyze the performance of our protocols when
the percentage of common communities between the Initiator and the Responder varies
between 0% and 100%. Figure 2.5.2 shows the computation cost. In particular, L1P’s
computation cost is irrelevant to the percentage of common communities since the computation cost of L1P does not depend on |C I ∩ C R |. Besides, both EL2P’s and L3P’s
computation cost increase only a little as |C I ∩ C R | increases. Regarding the communication overhead, Figure 2.5.2 shows that the communication overhead of the three protocols
almost remains the same even when |C I ∩ C R | increases from 0% to 100% of the size
of the overall community set. Fig. 2.5.2 shows the impact of the percentage of common
communities on the total protocol running time. EL2P and L3P experience slight increase
in total protocol running time since the computational (and communication too in L2P)
overhead increases with the increase of |C I ∩ C R |. Similarly, there is slight increase in the
energy consumption of L1P and of EL2P when the fraction of the common communities
over the size of the overall community set increases as shown in Figure 2.5.2. The energy
consumption of L3P remains constant since there is no increase in communication, and
hence no additional energy consumption, when the percentage of common communities
increase. We further divide the computation, communication, and energy cost in this set
of experiments into the corresponding cost incurred by the Initiator and the Responder in
Figure 2.24-Figure 2.29.
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2.6

Conclusion
The ever increasing use of OSNs has introduced a new paradigm in interacting with

existing friends and making new friends in online world as well as in real life. Current
schemes lead to privacy breaches. How to enable people to explore new friends in OSNs
while preserving their privacy is an important and challenging problem. In this chapter, we
have exploited the community structure of an OSN to defne a realistic asymmetric social
proximity measure, and presented three effcient protocols for privately computing the social proximity between two users in OSN. We have validated the proposed measure using
real social network data and the simulation study shows the effcacy and the effciency of
the schemes compared to the state-of-the-art schemes.
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CHAPTER 3
SPA: A SECURE AND PRIVATE AUCTION FRAMEWORK FOR DECENTRALIZED
ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS

3.1 Introduction
E-commerce has exploded in the last decade. It enables the buying and selling of
goods and services via electronic channels, primarily the Internet, and has become an indispensable part of our daily lives. On the other hand, the security and privacy threats on
e-commerce are also on the rise. The threat model includes not only the usual malicious
attacker(s), but also the advanced persistent threat (APT) and/or global surveillance capability from very resourceful entities/attackers. Particularly, attackers may compromise the
e-commerce service providers’ servers and steal consumers’ confdential information like
their personal data and buying/selling history. Such information can be used for many privacy intrusive purposes like directed marketing, user profling. Besides, in auction based
e-commerce like eBay, users’ bidding statistics reveal their valuations for the items being
auctioned and the server can utilize the statistical information to increase its fnancial gain
in future auctions of similar items.
The explosive growth of online social networks (OSNs) over the past several years has
dramatically changed the way information is produced and propagated in the world, and
has made OSNs potential new great marketplaces for e-commerce. In particular, in OSNs,
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the traditional unidirectional information fows, where information (e.g., breaking news,
events) fows from a source (e.g., news organizations) to the consumers are being replaced
with multidirectional fows, where the ordinary users of OSNs (like Facebook, Twitter,
Youtube) are both the sources and the consumers of the information. This shift in information paradigm has been proven to be powerful in strengthening the connections among
users, and hence can facilitate large-scale e-commerce. However, OSNs also raise serious
concerns about users’ privacy since the traditional OSNs store users’ private personal, historical, and relationship information. For instance, Twitter was attacked in early January
2013 and about 250,000 user accounts might have been compromised, with names and
e-mails possibly being uncovered [12]. Facebook, Apple, Microsoft were under similar
attacks in February 2013 [37]. Thus, auctions in traditional OSNs will inevitably lead to
security and privacy problems. Recently, decentralized online social networks (DOSNs)
like [8, 18], and Dispora [1], attract users’ intensive attention, where users own and store
their private data on their own computers or the servers they trust. In this work, we exploit
the rich connectivity and the distributed system architecture of DOSNs to develop a secure
and private auction framework called SPA, which requires no trust among the participants
for the privacy and correctness of auction outcomes.
The proposed auction framework SPA is based on Vickrey auction [68]. Specifcally,
auctions are frequently employed for determining resource allocations and selling prices.
Many auction schemes have been proposed in the literature (please refer to [13] for a review on auction protocols). Vickrey auction adopted in this study, also known as second
price auction, is a sealed-bid auction, in which bidders send their sealed bids to a trusted
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auctioneer. The winning bidder of an auction is the highest bidder and is charged the second highest bidding price. Due to this pricing mechanism, it can be proved [68] that the
bidders in Vickrey auction have the highest pay-off when they bid their true valuations of
the goods being auctioned and hence have no incentives to bid strategically. Vickrey auction has attracted a lot of research interests because of this interesting property. However,
it has rarely been used in practice mainly due to the following reasons. First, bidders hesitate to reveal their true valuations to the auctioneer who may exploit such information for
privacy invasive purposes as mentioned before. Second, if the auctioneer is dishonest, it
can cheat the winning bidder by creating an artifcial second highest bid with bid price just
lower than the highest bid since it knows all users’ bidding prices.
The remedy to the problem of limited usage of Vickrey auction is to ensure each individual bidder that frst, his/her bidding privacy (e.g., identities, bidding prices, histories)
is preserved regardless of the number of possible other colluding bidders, and second,
there is no need to bank on the honesty of the auctioneer for the correctness of auction
outcomes. Our auction framework SPA consists of three phases: identity initiation, buyerseller matching, and private auction. It can guarantee users’ privacy and auction correctness, while only revealing minimum information, i.e., the winning price and the winning
bidder’s public pseudo identity.
Specifcally, in the identity initiation phase, each user who would like to participate in
an auction obtains a public and a private pseudo identity (ID) from a Trusted Third Party.
In the “buyer-seller matching” phase, we develop an effcient algorithm to enable the users
interested in buying/selling item(s) to distribute their intents and match each other. In par68

ticular, the users utilize both social links and the underlying Distributed Hash Table (DHT)
links to route their advertisement messages to a randomly chosen user, called the bridge
node, who then helps match the buyers and sellers. In the private auction phase, we design
an effcient bidder-resolved private auction protocol. Particularly, bidders use their public
pseudo IDs to get authenticated through non-interactive zero knowledge (NIZK) proofs.
Thus, their ID privacy can be protected. Then, the authenticated bidders collaboratively
construct a public encryption key based on a distributed exponential Elgamal cryptosystem. They send their encrypted bidding vectors to the bridge node, which can thus be
protected against attacks like colluding. The bidders also sign their encrypted bids with
an anonymous signature scheme so that the bids are non-repudiable. After that, the bridge
node calculates the winning price under public scrutiny, without revealing any bidder’s
bidding vector. The winning bidder can fnally be determined without revealing his/her
bidding vector.
Besides, we analyze the computation and communication complexities of the proposed
private auction scheme, which are O(n + K) for each node where n is the number of
bidders and K is the number of pricing points, while those of previous auction schemes
(without the winning bidder identifcation process) [7] are O(nK) at best. Security and
privacy of SPA are also investigated.
We summarize our major contributions in this work as follows.
• To the best of our knowledge, the proposed auction framework SPA is the frst attempt to address auctions in DOSNs.
• We design a distributed private buyer-seller matching scheme to enable auctions in
DOSNs where no central server or auctioneer is available. The communication cost
is O(log n) where n is the network size.
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• We develop a fully private distributed auction protocol, whose computation and communication complexities are both O(n + K) for each node where K is the dimension
of a seller’s price vector. In contrast, the most effcient existing distributed private
auctions like [7] are not fully private and have higher complexities of O(nK).
• SPA can provide security, privacy, authenticity, non-repudiation, and correctness for
the auctions.
• We implement our auction protocol and show that it outperforms previous auction
schemes signifcantly in terms of both computation and communication costs.
The rest of the Chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we briefy discuss the existing works that are most related to our work. Section 3.3 presents the system
model, adversary model, and design goals. Section 3.4 introduces the cryptographic and
DHT preliminaries for our protocol design. Section 3.5 describe the detailed design of the
proposed SPA auction framework. We analyze the computation/communication complexity and privacy/security in Section 3.6. We present the performance evaluation results in
Section 3.7 and fnally conclude the Chapter in Section 3.8.

3.2

Related Work
In this section, we introduce the important existing works that are most relevant to our

study.

3.2.1

Decentralized Online Social Networks (DOSNs)

Currently most OSN service providers like Twitter, Facebook, Google+ use central
servers to store users’ private data, which, however, raises great concerns about users’ privacy. For example, Twitter was attacked in early January 2013 and about 250,000 user
accounts might have been compromised, with names and e-mails possibly being uncovered [12]. Facebook, Apple, Microsoft were under similar attacks in February 2013 [37].
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Besides, users may not have connectivity to the server all the time. Thus, recently the
research on decentralized online social networks (DOSNs) has attracted intense attention.
There have been several proposals for DOSNs [8, 18] in the literature and some (e.g., [1])
have taken off and are increasingly popular. Specifcally, PeerSoN [8] has a two-layer
architecture where peers (with social relationships) communicate with each other using
a distributed harsh table (DHT) based lookup service. Safebook [18] proposes to build
concentric rings of nodes around each node, based on the degree of trust among nodes, to
provide trusted data storage, profle data retrieval, and communication obfuscation through
indirection. Diaspora [1] is a popular DOSN, where users can host their data on their own
computers or in the servers they trust.

3.2.2

Distributed Hash Table

Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs) have been used as effcient lookup schemes in peer-topeer systems. In particular, each peer is assigned a unique ID and keeps a record of a small
fraction (usually log n, n is the network size) of the nodes in the network, which are determined by certain specifc algorithm to guarantee effcient lookup service. For instance,
Chord [66] uses consistent hashing [40] to assign node ID and to map a given key or data
to a specifc node. Other notable and widely referred DHT schemes include Kamedia [54],
CAN [61], Pastry [62], and Tapestry [76]. Recently, DHT systems are designed while addressing security (especially against sybil attack) [45, 73] and anonymity [69, 70] issues.
Our proposed private auction protocol utilizes DHTs (based on the Chord [66] protocol)
and social links for effcient advertisement distribution and buyer seller matching.
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3.2.3

Cryptographic Auction Protocols

The necessity of providing security and privacy for the participants of an auction has
led to intensive research activities on cryptographic auction protocols. Yao’s garbled circuit
[72] based multi-party computation (MPC) is tailored to design secure auction [39,58] with
multiple (two) auctioneers under a passive adversary model, where the two auctioneers are
assumed not to collude with each other. Similar threshold based MPC auction protocols
[33, 42, 63] rely on multiple auctioneers and are secure as long as there are no more than
a certain fraction of the total number of auctioneers colluding with each other. Lipmaa
et al. [51] employ homomorphic encryption to design a secure Vickrey auction scheme,
where the semi-honest auctioneer therein knows all users’ bidding prices.
A few approaches have been developed to improve the privacy in auction. Brandt [6]
propose a private auction scheme, in which the bidders engage in cryptographic protocols
and jointly compute the outcome of an auction, and later improve the protocol in [7]. In
such auctions, collusion between any numbers of bidders but the total number of bidders
is insuffcient to compromise the auction privacy. The computation complexity and communication complexity of the Vickrey based auction scheme in [7] are both O(nK), where
n is the network size and K is the number of possible bidding values. However, Dreier
et al. [23] show that the bid privacy in [7] can be breached if interactive Zero Knowledge
Proof (ZKPs) are used. More importantly, even if Non-Interactive ZKPs (NIZKPs) are
used, due to the lack of authentication, malicious bidders can mount a collaborative attack to breach the privacy of a targeted bidder. In contrast, our proposed auction protocol
is a fully private auction protocol with both communication and computation complexi72

ties being O(K) (O(K) if with the winner identifcation process), and hence much more
effcient.

3.3

Problem Formulation

3.3.1

System Model

We consider a Decentralized Online Social Network (DOSN) consisting of three layers
as shown in Figure 3.1. The OSN layer at the top includes social network users along with
the relationships among them. Particularly, an OSN can be defned as a graph G = (V, E),
where the set of vertices V = {v1 , v2 , ..., vn } represent nodes (users) in the network and
the set of undirected edges E = {eij } (1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, i 6= j) represent the friendships or
social ties among the nodes. In the absence of a central server, the Distributed Hash Table
(DHT) layer provides the peer-to-peer lookup functionality in the DOSN, which we utilize
to distribute the advertisement messages of buyers and sellers. Unlike OSN links, the DHT
links are directed. We build the DHT links based on Chord DHT protocol [66], which will
be briefy introduced in Section 3.4.3. Each node i has a “Chord ID” at the DHT layer
denoted by ui . The actual communications take place at the Internet layer at the bottom.
Each user in the DOSN is a potential buyer/seller and has a public page where, if the user
is selected as a bridge node (see Section 3.5), the information on the item for sale, the
encrypted bids from the buyers, and auction related computations are hosted. A fxed time
period (e.g., a day or a week) is determined for each auction during which buyers need to
submit their bids to the bridge node.
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Figure 3.1
A Decentralized Online Social Network (DOSN) consisting of three layers.
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3.3.2

Adversary Model

The adversaries taken into consideration in this work are mainly the participants in the
auctions, such as bidders, sellers, auctioneers (i.e., bridge nodes). These participants may
be interested in bidders’ bidding prices in order to enhance their fnancial gain in the current
auction or in the future auctions. For example, if a seller knows the bidding statistics of
an item, he/she can exploit that information in future auctions to maximize his/her own
fnancial gain. Similarly, bidders’ identities can also be of interest to the adversaries, e.g.,
for targeted advertisement. Besides, the adversaries include the malicious bidders who may
send bogus bidding values just to hinder the outcome of the auction. Note that we do not
consider the possible adversaries at the DHT layer and Internet layer who may try to disrupt
the auction by replaying or dropping the auction messages. There have been several works
addressing such attacks [45, 73] and protecting privacy at the DHT layer [69, 70]. While
our scheme can be easily built on these DHT protocols to provide security and privacy at
the DHT and Internet layers, in this work we employ a widely referred DHT protocol [66]
and mainly focus on the possible adversaries in our auction scheme as mentioned above.

3.3.3

Design Goals

Our design goals are summarized as follows:
• Security: The proposed system may be under various attacks such as impersonation, colluding. Our goal is to protect malicious attackers from disrupting auction
outcomes by indulging in the intermediate computations in the protocol.
• Privacy: In the proposed Vickrey based auction scheme, where buyers bid with
their true valuations of the items being auctioned, the bid privacy is important to
the buyers. All buyers’ and sellers’ identities should be protected too. Our goal
is to provide privacy (e.g., bidding prices, identities) for users during and after the
auctions and make sure that users’ buying/selling histories cannot be tracked.
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• Authenticity and Non-Repudiation: Since bidders’ identities are hidden during
the auctions to protect their privacy, we need to validate that the bidders are legal
users in the system. We also need to verify that the bidding values are legit as they
are unknown to the auctioneer. Besides, we aim to achieve non-repudiation in the
auctions, i.e., guarantee that bidders cannot deny their bidding. Thus, our goal is to
ensure authenticity and non-repudiation in the auctions.
• Effciency: Social networks usually host a large number of users, all of whom can
engage in auctions. Therefore, the communication/computation complexity of auction schemes should not increase rapidly with the number of participating users. Our
goal is to obtain high effciency in the auctions in terms of communication and computation complexities.

3.4

Preliminaries

3.4.1

ElGamal Cryptosystem

ElGamal cryptosystem [24] is a semantically secure homomorphic cryptosystem based
on the intractability of the discrete logarithm problem in fnite felds. In particular, let p and
q be two large strong prime numbers such that p = 2q+1. Let Gq denote a suffciently large
multiplicative subgroup of Z∗p with order q. A user chooses a random x ∈ Gq as the private
key, and y = g x mod p as the public key where g is a common generator of Gq . All the
calculations are modulo-p unless mentioned otherwise. A message m ∈ Gq for the user
is encrypted as Enc(m) = hα, βi = hg r , my r i, where r ∈ Gq is a local random number
generated by the encrypting party. The user can then decrypt the message by calculating
Dec(α, β) =

β
αx

=

my r
(g r )x

= m. ElGamal cryptosystem is multiplicative homomorphic,

i.e., Dec(Enc(m1 ) · Enc(m2 )) = Dec(hg r1 · g r2 , m1 y r1 · m2 y r2 i) = m1 · m2 . Additive
homomorphism can be obtained with what is sometimes called “exponential” ElGamal,
in which encryption is performed as Enc(m) = hα, βi = hg r , g m y r i and decryption can
be obtained by Dec(α, β) =

β
αx

= g m . Thus, Dec(Enc(m1 ) · Enc(m2 )) = Dec(hg r1 ·
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g r2 , g m1 y r1 · g m2 y r2 i) = g m1 +m2 . Note that since the decryption results in g m instead of
m, it is computationally intractable to obtain m from g m due to the intractability of the
discrete logarithm problem. The proposed auction scheme employs exponential ElGamal
to utilize the additive homomorphic property, and only needs to determine whether m is
zero which can be easily done.
Moreover, ElGamal cryptosystem can be used in distributed sysetms where there is
strong privacy requirement. In particular, users can encrypt and decrypt messages in a
distributed manner. A user can protect his/her privacy against the collusion among any
number of users less than the total number of users. In the following, we describe how
distributed encryption and decryption of ElGamal cryptosystem can be carried out.
• Distributed Key Generation: Each user vi participating in the distributed key generation selects xi as his/her private key and publishes Q
yi = g xi as his/her
public key.
Pn
n
xi
i
=1
The public key for distributed encryption is then y = i=1 yi = g
.
• Distributed Encryption: A user can use the public key y to encrypt a message m.
The resulting ciphertext is hα, βi = hg r , g m y r i .
• Distributed Decryption: All the users who participated in public key generation need to cooperate to decrypt the encrypted message. Specifcally, if hα, βi =
hg r , g m y r i is the encrypted message, then each user publishes αi = αxi . The original
m r
message can be recovered by any user by computing Qnβ αi = (Pgni=1y xi )r = g m .
i=1

3.4.2

g

Zero Knowledge Proofs

The Zero Knowledge Proof (ZKP), introduced by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff
(GMR) [31], is an important tool in cryptography. A prover can use a ZKP protocol to
prove the possession of certain information to a verifer without revealing the very information. The absence of a trusted central authority in a DOSN makes the network inherently
vulnerable to malicious users who aim to fulfll their malicious intents and do not follow
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the proposed auction protocol. Besides, the strong privacy requirement in our schemes
necessitates preserving bidders’ anonymity and their bidding price privacy, which further
complicates the authenticity and enforcement of correct protocol execution by all the participants. In order to ensure the bidders follow the proposed auction protocol correctly, we
require all bidders (provers) to prove to a bridge node (verifer, see Section 3.5 for details)
using ZKPs in different steps of the protocol. We describe several ZKPs we will use in
SPA as follows. All the calculations are modulo-p unless mentioned otherwise.

3.4.2.1

Proof of Knowledge of A Discrete Logarithm

Schnorr [65] develops a ZKP that a prover (a bidder) can use to prove the knowledge
of x such that y = g x to a verifer (a bridge node) who knows y and g.
• The bidder chooses a random r and sends z = g r to the bridge node.
• The bridge node sends a random challenge c to the bidder.
• The bidder computes a = (r + cx) mod q and sends to the bridge node.
• The bridge node checks to see if g a = zy c .

If the equality holds, the bidder is able to prove to the bridge node the knowledge of x such
that y = g x without disclosing x.

3.4.2.2

Proof of Equality of Two Discrete Logarithms

When a prover (a bidder) needs to prove that two values (encryptions, say y1 = g1x
and y2 = g2x ) are computed using the same private key (x) to a verifer (a bridge node
who knows y1 , y2 , g1 , g2 ), the protocol below [11] can be employed to realize the zeroknowledge proof.
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• The bidder chooses a random r and sends z1 = g1r and z2 = g2r to the bridge node.
• The bridge node sends a random challege c to the bidder node.
• The bidder then computes a = (r + cx) mod q and sends to the bridge node.
• The bridge node checks to see if g1a = z1 y1c and g2a = z2 y2c .
If both the equalities hold, the bridge node is convinced that the same x is used to compute
y1 and y2 .

3.4.2.3

Proof That An Encrypted Value Decrypts to Either 1 Or 0

In our private auction scheme (Section 3.5.3), a bidder prepares a bidding vector by
encrypting each element (either 0 or 1) separately. While the actual bidding price (and
bidding vector) remains private to the bidder throughout the auction, it is necessary to
make sure the bidding vector is prepared correctly in order to deter any malicious bidder’s
attempt to disrupt the protocol. A bidder can use the protocol proposed by Cramer et
al. [14] to prove to the bridge node that his/her bidding vector is composed of encryptions
of m ∈ {0, 1}. Specifcally, let hα, βi = hg r , g m y r i be the ElGamal encryption of message
m.
• If m = 0, the bidder chooses r1 , d1 , w at random and sends hα, βi, a1 = g r1 β d1 , b1 =
y r1 (α/g)d1 and a2 = g w , b2 = y w to the bridge node.
If m = 1, the bidder chooses r2 , d2 , w at random and sends hα, βi, a1 = g w , b1 =
y w , a2 = g r2 β d2 , and b2 = y r2 αd2 to the bridge node.
• The bridge node sends a challenge c, chosen at random, to the bidder node.
• If m = 0, the bidder sends d1 , d2 = c − d1 mod q, r1 , and r2 = w − rd2 mod q to the
bridge node.
If m = 1, the bidder sends d1 = c − d2 mod q , d2 , r1 = w − rd1 mod q, and r2 to
the bridge node
• The bridge node checks whether c = d1 +d2 , mod q a1 = g r1 β d1 , b1 = y r1 (α/g)d1 , a2 =
g r2 β d2 , and b2 = y r2 αd2 .
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If all the equalities hold, the bidder is able to prove that the ciphertext decrypts to either 1
or 0.

3.4.3

Distributed Hash Table Overlay

Chord [66] is a distributed lookup protocol for mapping (and retrieving) a given key
(or data) onto a specifc node in a distributed and scalable manner. In particular, each
node is assigned k-bit identifer, called “Chord ID”, using consistent hashing [40]. The
nodes’ identifers are arranged in the form of a modulo-2k one-dimensional identifer circle
known as chord ring. Each key is assigned to a peer node whose Chord ID is equal to
or immediately next to the hash value of the key. In order to provide an effcient and
scalable lookup service for the key, each node in the system stores information about a
small fraction (i.e., log n where n is the network size) of all the nodes in what is known
as the fnger table. The ith (0 ≤ i ≤ (log n − 1)) element in the fnger table of a node
contains the identifer and the address (IP address, port number, etc.) of the node which is
at 2i distance apart in the chord ring. Figure 3.1 shows the fnger tables of nodes u0 , u1 , and
u4 . The outgoing arrows from a node in Figure 3.1 go to the nodes which are included in
the current node’s fnger table. In order to look up a given key (or data) in the network, the
source node hashes the key and searches in its fnger tables. If it matches the Chord ID of
certain node in its table, the node forwards the request to that node. Otherwise, it forwards
the request to the node in its fnger table which is closest to the hash value of the key in
the chord ring. The same procedure follows at the new node until the request reaches the
node which has the key. Both the lookup communication cost and the storage cost scale
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as O(log n). In this study, we adapt the Chord DHT to design an effcient advertisement
distribution scheme (Section 3.5.2.1) utilizing both DHT and social links.

3.5

A Secure and Private Auction Framework: SPA
The proposed secure and private auction framework for DOSNs, named SPA, consists

of three phases. In the frst phase called “Identity Initiation”, all nodes that would like
to participate in auctions obtain public/private pseudo IDs from a a Trusted Third Party
(TTP). In the second phase called “Buyer-Seller Matching”, the nodes that are interested
in buying/selling item(s) distribute their intents through the social network via both DHT
and social links during a specifc time interval. For a particular item Fi 1 at a specifc time
interval Tk , a node, called the bridge node vB i,k , is chosen to match the sellers and buyers.
In the third phase called “Private Auction”, the bidders send sealed (encrypted) bids to the
bridge node and the bridge node helps execute the auction. In what follows, we detail these
three phases respectively.

3.5.1

Phase I: Identity Initiation

In order to be able to participate in an auction while preserving the ID privacy, each
node requests a pair of public/private pseudo IDs from a TTP. Specifcally, the TTP chooses
two large primes p̃ and q̃ and publishes N = p̃q̃ along with a generator g̃ of a suffciently
large subgroup of ZN∗ . When a user vi needs a public pseudo ID, it sends a signed request
together with its certifed public key to the TTP. For each such request, the TTP chooses
a random ρi such that gcd(ρi , λ(N )) = 1, where λ(·) is the Carmichael function [55].
1
The item Fi is drawn from a universal set of items or goods F, Fi ∈ F, such that same name is used for
an item by all the participants in an auction.
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ρi works as a public pseudo ID for user vi . The TTP also computes a private pseudo ID
si = g̃ 1/ρi = g̃ di , where ρi di = 1 mod φ(N ) and φ(N ) = (p−1)(q−1) is the Eular’s totient
function. Note that all the calculations are modulo-N unless specifed otherwise. The TTP
TTP
signs the public pseudo ID, i.e., Si = KD
(ρi ), and generates a certifcate Ci = (Si , ρi ),
TTP
is the private key of the TTP. The private pseudo ID (si ) and the certifcate
where KD

(Ci ) are then securely delivered (encrypted with user vi ’s public key) to user vi .

3.5.2 Phase II: Buyer-Seller Matching
3.5.2.1

Advertisement Distribution

The absence of a central server in a DOSN necessitates the design of a distributed
scheme to ensure the advertisement of a seller/buyer of an item reaches the right potential buyers/sellers. One naive solution is to broadcast the advertisements of sellers/buyers
throughout the network. However, this will cause a serious message fooding in the network. For example, in a DOSN if each user has 100 friends on average, then the number of
broadcast messages from a single user can, in the worst case, lead to 100 million messages
in just 4 hops. This kind of broadcast fooding will inevitably congest the network and is
not suitable for any practical application in a large-scale DOSN.
In contrast, SPA features a distributed advertisement distribution algorithm. Specifcally, the sellers and the potential buyers distribute their intents through unicast advertisement messages utilizing both DHT and social links. All the advertisement messages for
an item Fi in a time interval Tk intersect at the same bridge node vB i,k . The format of
advertisement messages is shown in Table 3.1. M essageID is a random ID chosen by the
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source of the advertisement (a buyer or a seller), SrcID changes in every hop and is the
Chord ID of the current node, H(·) is a public hash function, B/S denotes whether the
source is a buyer or a seller, and the P ayload of a seller’s advertisement message contains
the details about the item Fi , such as the price vector defned by the seller (see Section
3.5.3 for details) and others like shipping information/estimates. The bridge node is determined based on the hash value aik = H(Fi ||Tk ). Particularly, the node vB i,k , whose Chord
ID is either equal to or immediately next (in clockwise, i.e., increasing, order) to aik in the
chord ring, serves as the bridge node for the item Fi during the time interval Tk . The time
interval Tk is the time period, e.g., a day or a week, during which the auction for the item
takes place. This timestamp Tk serves two important purposes: frst, it puts a time limit
on each trade, and more importantly, second, it randomly changes the bridge node in each
time interval so that not a single node has to carry the computation overhead of being a
bridge node all the time.
Table 3.1
The format of advertisement message.
M essageID

SrcID

H(Fi ||Tk )

B/S

P ayload

The advertisement messages can be delivered to the bridge node as follows. Note that
in addition to a fnger table, we let each node keep the Chord ID and the address (IP
address, port number, etc.) of its predecessor and of its successor on the Chord ring, as
well as those of its friends and their predecessors on the Chord ring. When receiving an
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Figure 3.2
Algorithm 1: Distributed Advertisement Distribution.
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advertisement message, each node frst checks to see if it itself is the bridge node, i.e., if
aik is equal to its Chord ID or between its predecessor’s Chord ID and its Chord ID. If
so, this node sends an acknowledgement message back to the sender of this advertisement
message. Otherwise, it stores the M essageID and SrcID (along with the IP address of
SrcID) of this message. The node then checks if its successor on the Chord ring is the
bridge node, i.e., if aik is equal to its successor’s Chord ID or between its own Chord ID
and its successor’s Chord ID. If so, it forwards the message to its successor. Otherwise,
the node checks if any of the nodes in its fnger table is the bridge node, i.e., if aik is equal
to any node’s Chord ID. If so, it forwards the message to that node. Otherwise, the node
checks if any of its friends is the bridge nodes, i.e., if aik is equal to any friend’s Chord
ID or between any friend’s Chord ID and its predecessor’s Chord ID. If so, it forwards the
message to that friend. Otherwise, it forwards the message to the node that precedes and
is closest to aik , utilizing both its fnger table and its friends list. The procedure continues
until the message reaches the bridge node. The above advertisement distribution scheme is
detailed in Algorithm 1 in Figure 3.2.
For example, as shown in Figure 3.1, assume that v0 is the bridge node for an item Fi
in time interval Tk , i.e., aik ∈ (predecessor(v0 ), v0 ] where predecessor(v0 ) is the Chord
ID of the predecessor of v0 on the Chord ring. Suppose that node v1 currently has the
advertisement message. We can see that node v1 , its successor v2 , and the nodes in its
fnger table, and its friends are all not the bridge node. In this case, node v1 forwards the
message to the closest preceding node to the bridge node in the Chord ring, considering
all the nodes in the fnger table (v2 , v3 , v5 ) and on its friend list (v2 , v4 , v7 ), i.e., node v7
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in this example. Node v7 then fnds that its successor, i.e., node v0 , is the bridge node,
and forwards the advertisement message to it. Ultimately, the bridge node receives the
advertisement messages from all interested participants (seller and buyers) and starts the
matching process.

3.5.2.2

Acknowledgement (ACK) Message Distribution

Every time a bridge node receives an advertisement message, it sends an ACK message
back to the source node of the message reversely along the route that the message was
delivered on. The format of ACK messages are shown in Table 3.2. In particular, each node
on the route kept a record of M essageID and SrcID while forwarding the advertisement
message to the bridge node. When forwarding the ACK message, the DestID feld is set
to SrcID of the corresponding advertisement message. The payload of the ACK message
contains the address (e.g., IP address and the port number), of the bridge node where
the price vectors of all the sellers are accessible and all the auction related computation
(see Section 3.5.3) takes place under the scrutiny of all the bidders in the future. Once a
buyer/seller node receives the ACK message, it connects to the bridge node via the Internet
layer 2 to access the information provided by the sellers in their advertisement messages,
and decides which one of the many sellers’ items it wants to bid for.
2

One may argue that the bridge node is able to know the IP address and may be able to identify the
bidders when they connect to its page. However, the bidders can use services like Tor [21] to hide their true
IP addresses.
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Table 3.2
The format of ACK message.
M essageID

DestID

H(Fi ||Tk )

P ayload

3.5.3 Phase III: Private Auction
Recall that in a DOSN, there are no trusted central auctioneers. Thus, distributed
bidder-resolved auctions are indispensable for security and privacy purposes, in which
bidders use cryptographic protocols to jointly determine the auction result. Previously proposed such auction schemes like [7] are not fully private and have high communication
and computation complexities, which limit their usage in practical applications. In the
following, we develop a private and more effcient auction protocol.

3.5.3.1

Outline

We frst present the conceptual outline of the proposed private Vickrey based auction
protocol. Without loss of generality, let us assume that a seller defnes a price vector

|
p = pK pK−1 ...p1 of K possible bidding prices. A bidder, say node vi , submits a bid

|
i
i
i i
b = bK
bK−1 ...bi1 , where bk ∈ {0, 1} and 1 ≤ k ≤ K. If bidder vi ’s bidding price is
pli (1 ≤ li ≤ K), then bik is equal to 1 when k = li and equal to 0 otherwise.
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We then defne “a doubly-integrated bid vector”, denoted by b̂i , for bidder vi as
⎛
⎞ ⎛
⎞
i
biK
⎜ b̂K ⎟ ⎜
⎟
⎜
⎟ ⎜
⎟
⎜
⎟ ⎜
⎟
⎜b̂i ⎟ ⎜
⎟
2biK + biK−1
⎜ K−1 ⎟ ⎜
⎟
⎜
⎟ ⎜
⎟
⎜
⎟ ⎜
⎟
⎜b̂i ⎟ ⎜
⎟
i
i
i
2b
+
2b
+
b
⎜ K−2 ⎟ ⎜
⎟
K
K−1
K−2
⎜
⎟ ⎜
⎟
⎜ . ⎟ ⎜
⎟
.
⎜ .. ⎟ ⎜
⎟
.
.
⎜
⎟ ⎜
⎟
i
⎟=⎜
⎟
b̂ = ⎜
⎜
⎟ ⎜
⎟
⎜ b̂i ⎟ ⎜2bi + 2bi
i
i⎟
⎜ k ⎟ ⎜ K
K−1 + · · · + 2bk+1 + bk ⎟
⎜
⎟ ⎜
⎟
⎜ . ⎟ ⎜
⎟
..
⎜ . ⎟ ⎜
⎟
.
⎜ . ⎟ ⎜
⎟
⎜
⎟ ⎜
⎟
⎜
⎟ ⎜
⎟
⎜ i ⎟ ⎜ i
⎟
i
+ · · · + 2bi3 + bi2 ⎟
⎜ b̂2 ⎟ ⎜ 2bK + 2bK−1
⎜
⎟ ⎜
⎟
⎝
⎠ ⎝
⎠
2biK + 2biK −1 + · · · + 2bi2 + bi1
b̂i1

(3.1)

Thus, when the bidding price is pli (1 ≤ li ≤ K), the vector b̂i is as follows:
bˆik = biK when k = K,
and

bˆik =

⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
0, when li < k < K,
⎪
⎪
⎪
!
⎪
K
⎨
X
i
i
2
bm + bk = 1, when k = li
.
⎪
⎪
m=k+1
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩2, when k < li

(3.2)

(3.3)

Assume that there are totally n bidders bidding for the same item. The sum of all the
doubly-integrated bid vectors, denoted by B̂, can be obtained as3
B̂ =

n
X

b̂i .

(3.4)

i=1

The vector B̂’s elements would be 1, 3, 5, ..., (2M − 1) corresponding to the 1st , 2nd , 3rd ,
..., and M th highest bidding prices.
3

The bridge node can index the bidders by the order of received bids.
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The winning price calculation process is described in the following. We calculate a
vector P as follows:


P = B̂ − 3 · UK ∗ R

(3.5)

where R is a random K-dimensional vector jointly generated by all the bidders (R(k) =
6 0
for 1 ≤ k ≤ K), UK is a K-dimensional vector whose elements are all 1’s, and ‘∗’
refers to component-wise multiplication. Thus, all the elements in P are non-zero random
numbers, except the element corresponding to the second highest bidding price which is
zero. Thus, if P(w) = 0, then pw is the winning price of the auction.
Winner bidder determination process follows the winning price calculation process.
If a malicious winning bidder does not come forward and claim the bid, the auction would
be incomplete and the item remains unsold. Therefore, in order to ensure non-repudiation,
it is necessary to identify the winning bidder. Particularly, the winner of the auction is
bidder vi if W i is zero, where
W i = (b̂iw − 2) · Ri

(3.6)

and Ri is a non-zero random number generated by bidder vi . Example 1 shows an example
for 4 bidders, in which X represents non-zero random values.

3.5.3.2

Cryptographic Protocol Design

Next we describe the details of the proposed cryptographic private auction protocol.
Recall that after each bidder bidding for the same item receives an ACK message from the
bridge node containing its address (IP address, port number, etc.), each bidder can access
the advertisements from all the sellers available at the bridge node and decide which par89

Suppose that the price vector given by a seller is p =
|
150140130120110100 . Assume that there are four bidders: v1 , v2 , v3 , and v4 , and their

|
1
bidding prices are 140, 130, 120, and 110, respectively. Therefore, b = 010000 ,

|

|

|
2
3
4
b = 001000 , b = 000100 , b = 000010 , Then, we have
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
⎛ ⎞
Example 1:


⎜0⎟
⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟
⎜1⎟
⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟
⎜2⎟
⎜ ⎟
1
2
3
4
ˆ + b̂ + b̂ + b̂ = ⎜ ⎟ +
ˆ = b
B
⎜ ⎟
⎜2⎟
⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟
⎜2⎟
⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
2
⎛⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎞ ⎛
⎞
⎛ ⎞
⎜⎜0⎟ ⎜3⎟⎟
⎜⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎟
⎜⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎟
⎜⎜1⎟ ⎜3⎟⎟
⎜⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎟
⎜⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎟
⎜⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎟
⎜⎜3⎟ ⎜3⎟⎟
⎜⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎟
⎜⎜ ⎟ − ⎜ ⎟⎟
⎜⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎟
⎜⎜5⎟ ⎜3⎟⎟
⎜⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎟
⎜⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎟
⎜⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎟
⎜⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎟
⎜⎜7⎟ ⎜3⎟⎟
⎜⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎟
⎝⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎠
8
3

⎜0⎟ ⎜0⎟ ⎜0⎟
⎜0⎟
⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟
⎜0⎟ ⎜0⎟ ⎜0⎟
⎜1⎟
⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟
⎜1⎟ ⎜0⎟ ⎜0⎟
⎜3⎟
⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟ + ⎜ ⎟ + ⎜ ⎟ = ⎜ ⎟, and P =
⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟
⎜2⎟ ⎜1⎟ ⎜0⎟
⎜5⎟
⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟
⎜2⎟ ⎜2⎟ ⎜1⎟
⎜7⎟
⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
⎝ ⎠
2
2
2
8

⎜R(1)⎟
⎜X ⎟
⎜
⎟
⎜ ⎟
⎜
⎟
⎜ ⎟
⎜R(2)⎟
⎜X ⎟
⎜
⎟
⎜ ⎟
⎜
⎟
⎜ ⎟
⎜
⎟
⎜ ⎟
⎜R(3)⎟
⎜0⎟
⎜
⎟
⎜ ⎟
⎜
⎟
⎜ ⎟
·⎜
⎟ = ⎜ ⎟. Since we have P(3) = 0, the winning price
⎜R(4)⎟
⎜X ⎟
⎜
⎟
⎜ ⎟
⎜
⎟
⎜ ⎟
⎜
⎟
⎜ ⎟
⎜
⎟
⎜ ⎟
⎜R(5)⎟
⎜X ⎟
⎜
⎟
⎜ ⎟
⎝
⎠
⎝ ⎠
R(6)
X

is pw = p3 = 130. According to (3.6), we get W31 = (b̂13 − 2) · R1 = (2 − 2) · R1 =
0, W32 = (b̂23 − 2) · R2 = (1 − 2) · R2 = X, W33 = (b̂33 − 2) · R3 = (0 − 2) · R3 =
X, W34 = (b̂43 − 2) · R4 = (0 − 2) · R4 = X . Thus, the winning bidder is v1 .
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ticular seller’s item to bid for. The bidders then send to the bridge node their encrypted
bids according to the price vector defned by the seller they choose. The bridge node fnally determines the winning price and the winning bidder. The proposed auction protocol
consists of fve processes as follows.

Public Pseudo ID Authentication

is the frst process of the proposed auction protocol.

After receiving a buying advertisement message from a bidder, the bridge node needs to
verify if it is an authentic user in the network so as to defend attacks like impersonation.
Thus, a bidder node vi needs to prove that it possesses the private pseudo ID si corresponding to the pubic pseudo ID ρi . We apply Fiat-Shamir heuristic to convert the interactive
proof [59] between a prover (a bidder) and a verifer (the bridge node) to a non-interactive
proof. Note that the purpose of having non-interactive zero knowledge (NIZK) proofs is
not only to reduce the communication complexity between the bidders and the bridge node,
but more importantly, to relax the assumption on trustworthy bridge nodes (i.e., honest verifers) in ZKPs. This is because the non-interactive proof of authenticity can be verifed
by all the parties participating in the auction and a dishonest bridge node will get caught.
In particular, the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [25] makes use of a hash function H̃(·), modelled
as a Random Oracle (RO), to construct a random challenge from the verifer. The public
pseudo ID authentication can be carried out following the steps below:
˜ ic
• Bidder vi chooses a random r̃, calculates z = r̃ρi mod N , and sends z, y = rs
mod N , and the certifcate Ci to the bridge node, where c = H̃(z).
• The bridge node checks and accepts the proof if z = y ρi g˜−c mod N .
Theorem 4
A legal node can always be successfully authenticated.
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Proof: Note that the bridge node can obtain the public pseudo ID ρi from the certifcate Ci
and that si = g̃ 1/ρi mod N . Thus, we have
y ρi g̃ −c ≡ (r̃sci )ρi g̃ −c ≡ r̃ρi g̃ c g̃ −c ≡ r̃ρi ≡ z

mod N.

(3.7)

Theorem 5
[Soundness] An illegal bidder node, who does not have a valid si and can not compute
in polynomial time the ρi -th root, has only negligible probability of begin successfully
authenticated.
Proof:An illegal bidder may be able to deceive the bridge node (verifer) if r̃ + c is divisible
by vi and sends z = g̃ r mod N and y = g̃ (r̃+c)/ρi mod N . The bridge node will accept the
proof, because
y ρi g˜−c ≡ (g̃ (r̃+c)/ρi )ρi ≡ g̃ r̃+c g̃ −c ≡ z

mod N.

(3.8)

However, the probability of this event is very low (∼ 1/N , where N is a very large number,
e.g, 1024 bit number)
Next we prove by contradiction [32] that an illegal bidder, without a valid si , cannot
increase this probability. In order to increase the probability, assume frst that the bidder is
able to compute ρi -th roots y 0 and y 00 of zg̃ c for two challenges c0 and c00 . Choose Bezout
coeffcients m̃ and k̃ such that:
ρi m̃ + (c0 − c00 )k˜ = ±1
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(3.9)

We have, gcd(ρi , c0 − c00 ) = 1, therefore, there always exist Bezout coeffcients m̃ and k̃ .
The following computation reveals si
 0 k˜ !±1
 0 k˜ !±1
y
y
ρi m̃
g̃ m
≡
s
i
y 00
y 00
˜ ±1
(c0 −c00 )k

≡(sρi i m̃ si

)

≡ si mod n

(3.10)

This, however, contradicts with the assumption that the bidder does not know si corresponding to ρi .

Note that in order to further reduce the communication cost between the bidders and
the bridge node, bidders can include this non-interactive proof in the payload of their advertisement messages as mentioned before.

Distributed Encryption Key Generation process follows public pseudo ID authentication process. Each bidder then chooses a random key xi ∈ Gq and sends yi = g xi mod p
to the bridge node with a ZKP of the knowledge of xi , i.e., a discrete logarithm regarding yi (Section 3.4.2.1). The bridge node makes all the yi ’s and the corresponding ZKPs
public. Each bidder can compute the encryption key (public key) as y =

Qn

i=1

yi . Note

that similarly, in order to reduce the communication complexity of interactive ZKPs and
relaxing the assumption on a reliable bridge node, we employ Fiat-Shamir heuristic [25] to
make the ZKP (and all the following ZKPs as well) non-interactive, i.e., use NIZK proofs.
In the Bid Encryption process, each bidder prepares his/her own bid and sends the
encrypted bid to the bridge node as follows.
• Bid
� vector by p=
� Preparation:
| Without loss of generality, we denote a seller’s price
|
pK pK−1 · · ·p1 and a bidder’s (node vi ’s) bidding vector by bi = biK biK−1 ...bi1 .
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Suppose node vi ’s bidding price is pli . Then, we have bik (1 ≤ k ≤ K) is equal to 1
when k = li and equal to 0 otherwise.
• Bid Encryption: The bidder then encrypts the bidding vector with the encryption
(public) key element by element, i.e., for any 1 ≤ k ≤ K, the bidder computes
i
i
i
Enc(bik ) = hαki , βki i = hg rk , g bk y rk i where rki ∈ Gq is a random number generated
by bidder vi .
ZKP Generation: The bidder vi needs to prove that the encrypted bidding vector
is generated adhering to the protocol. In particular, it needs to prove the following
facts in zero knowledge:
– Each element in its bidding vector is the encryption of either 1 or 0. The bidder
generates a ZKP as described in Section 3.4.2.3.
P
i
– Only one element in its bid vector corresponds to 1, i.e., K
k=1 bkQ= 1. The
� K βki 
bridge node uses the protocol described in 3.4.2.2 to show logy k=1
=
g
QK
logg ( k=1 αk xi ) in zero knowledge.
• Bid Signing and Publishing: Note that the encrypted bidding vectors obtained above
are repudiable. Before sending the encrypted bids to the bridge node, in order to
ensure authentication and non-repudiation, all bidders sign their bids with an anonymous (pseudo ID based) signature scheme [59] shown below. In the following, we
detail the process for bidder vi to sign each of the encrypted elements in the bidi
i
i
ding vector bi , i.e., Enc(bik ) = hαki , βki i = hg rk , g bk y rk i, and for the bridge node to
verify it. The calculations in this process take place in modulo-N unless mentioned
otherwise.
α i

– Bidder vi computes zαik = rαρii , αik = h(αki ||zαik ), and yαik = rαik si k , where
k
rαik is a random number generated by vi , and h(·) is a publicly known hash
function. Bidder vi also computes βki and yβki in a similar way. Then, bidder
vi generates the signature for the encrypted bid Enc(bik ) = hαki , βki i, which
is h(αik , yαik ), (βki , yβki )i, and sends it along with his/her certifcate Ci to the
bridge node.
– The bridge node obtains the public pseudo ID ρi of bidder vi from the certifcate
− i
− i
Ci and computes mαik = yαρii g̃ αk and mβki = yβρii g̃ βk . The bridge node
k

k

accepts the bid if h(αki ||mαik ) = αik and h(βki ||mβki ) = βki .
Theorem 6
If the bid from bidder vi is authentic, the following verifcation equations would hold:
h(αki ||mαik ) = αik and h(βki ||mβki ) = βki for any 1 ≤ k ≤ K.
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Proof: We present the proof by dropping the superscripts/subscripts of the subscripts in
the notations above for simplicity. Particularly, since mα = yαρi g̃ −α = (rα si α )ρi g˜−α =
rαρi (sρi i )α g̃ −α = rαρi g̃ α g̃ −α = rαρi = zα (note that sρi i = g̃ di ρi = g̃), we have h(α||mα ) =
h(α||zα ) = α . Similarly, we can prove that mβ = zβ and hence h(β||mβ ) = h(β||zβ ) =
β .
Note that any participants in the auction can check the verifcation equations.
Theorem 7
[Soundness] An illegal bidder node, who generates signature without valid si , has negligible probability of success for signed bid verifcation by a bridge node.
Proof: A bidder node vi signs his/her bid vector ,i.e, Enc(bik ) = hαki , βki i, 1 ≤ k ≤ K, with
the signature scheme. For each element Enc(bik ) = hαki , βki i, in the vector, one can see
from theorem 5, that if (rαρii + αki ) and (rβρii + βki ) are divisible by ρi , a malicious bidder is
k

k

able to manipulate zαik , zβki and yαik , yβki to successfully convince the verifer (bridge node)
node the authenticity of the signature on the bid element. However, the probability of this
event is < 1/N and the probability of such events for the whole bid vector is  1/N and
is negligible. Similarly, following the proof in theorem 5, a malicious bidder is unable to
increase this probability. Hence a signature generated by an illegal bidder without valid si
has negligible probability of being successfully verifed by the bridge node.

Winning Price Determination process is executed to calculate the auction clearing
price. Once all the bids are received within the time frame of current auction, the bridge
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node combines the encrypted bidding vectors to obtain the encrypted doubly-integrated bid
vector. For each bidder vi (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the bridge node computes Enc(b̂i ) as:
|



i

Enc(b̂ ) =

(3.11)

i
i
i
i
hα̂K
, β̂K
ihα̂K−1
, β̂K−1
i...hα̂1i , β̂1i i

where hα̂ki , β̂ki i is
*

K
Y

i 2
(αm
) · αki ,

m=k+1
K
X

*

K
Y

+
i 2
(βm
) · βki

m=k+1
i
2rm

+

K
X

rki

= g m=k+1

2bim

+

, g m=k+1
i

i

K
X

bki

i
2rm
+ rki +

y m=k+1

i

when 1 ≤ k < K, and hg rk , g bk y rk i when k = K. Defne δki as

(3.12)
PK

m=k+1

i
2rm
+ rki when

1 ≤ k < K and rki when k = K. Thus, for any 1 ≤ k ≤ K, we have
i

ˆi

i

hˆ
αki , β̂ki i = hg δk , g bk y δk i

(3.13)

where bˆik is defned in (3.2) and (3.3).
Similarly, the bridge node can obtain the encryption of the sum of all the doublyintegrated bid vectors as follows
Enc(B̂)

|
Qn
Q
n
i
i
=
i=1 Enc(b̂K ) . . .
i=1 Enc(b̂1 )

|
Qn ˆi Qn ˆi
Qn ˆi Qn ˆi
=
h i=1 αK , i=1 βK i . . . h i=1 α1 , i=1 β1 i

|
=
hα̂BK , β̂BK i hα̂BK−1 , β̂BK−1 i . . . hα̂B1 , β̂B1 i

(3.14)

where for any 1 ≤ k ≤ K,
*
hα̂Bk , β̂Bk i =

n
X

δki

g i=1
96

n
X

, g i=1

b̂ki

n
X

y i=1

δki +
(3.15)

Recall that we determine the winning price through (3.5). Thus, the bridge node frst
computes the encryption of a vector P = B̂ − 3 · UK as follows:
Enc(P) = Enc(B̂ − 3 · UK ) = Enc(B̂) ∗ Enc(−3UK )

(3.16)

which we denote by
|



.

hαPK , βPK i hαPK−1 , βPK−1 i . . . hαP1 , βP1 i

The bridge node then publishes the above calculations on its public profle, so that all the
bidders can verify the correctness of the computations.
In the next step, each bidder participates in the distributed decryption of the clearing
price. Specifcally, each bidder vi computes and sends to the bridge node
α0P i
β 0P i

|


=
=

(αPK )

(βPK )

i
RK

i
RK

(αPK−1 )

i
RK−1

. . . (αP1 )

R1i

|
(βPK−1 )

i
RK
−1

. . . (βP1 )

R1i

(3.17)

where Ri is a K-dimensional vector of non-zero random numbers generated by bidder
vi . In addition to α0P i and β 0P i , each bidder also proves in zero knowledge that the corresponding elements, e.g., the kth elements, of the vectors α0P i and β 0P i are obtained using
the same random value, e.g., Rki (as shown in Section 3.4.2.2).
The bridge node then combines the received values from the bidders to calculate hα0P , β 0P i
as follows:
h

n
Y
i=1

α0P i (K),

n
Y

β 0P i (K)i, . . . , h

i=1

n
Y
i=1
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α0P i (1),

n
Y
i=1

!|
β 0P i (1)i

(3.18)

Thus, all the bidders can calculate the winning price of the auction by following the distributed encryption approach, i.e., computing

Ω=

β 0 (K)
Qn P 0
xi
i=1 (αP (K))

β 0 (K−1)
Qn P 0
xi
i=1 (αP (K−1))

...

β 0 (1)
Qn P 0
xi
i=1 (αP (1))

|
(3.19)

Where (α0P (k))xi ’s (1 ≤ k ≤ K) are transmitted by bidder vi to the bridge node
and made public (along with a proof that the same xi was used as in the distributed key
generation process, as shown in Section 3.4.2.2), and
Pn
Qn
i
β 0P i (k)
(βPk ) i=1 Rk
i=1
Q
Q
P
P
Ω(k) = n
=
n
n
n
i
i
0
xi
(αPk ) i=1 Rk i=1 x
i=1 ( i=1 αP i (1))
Pn

i

P
(g P(k) · y r ) i=1 Rk
i
P(k)· n
i=1 Rk = g P(k) .
Pn
Pn
=
=
g
i
i
R
x
r
(g ) i=1 k i=1

(3.20)

where P is defned in (3.5). Therefore, the element pw of the price vector p is the winning
price if Ω(w) = g P(w) = g 0 = 1.

Winning Bidder Identifcation process follows winning price calculation process and
is needed to identify the winning bidder’s pseudo ID. Recall that the winning bidder can
be determined by checking if (3.6) is equal to 0. Only the winning bidder’s public pseudo
ID will be known to others. The winning bidder determination process is as follows.
First, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the bridge node computes,
Enc(W i ) = Enc(b̂iw − 2) = Enc(b̂iw ) · Enc(−2)

(3.21)

which we denote by hαW i , βW i i.
Ri
Ri
Then, each bidder vi computes hαW
i , βW i i, and sends it and a ZKP (as shown in Section
Ri
Ri
3.4.2.2) that αW
i , βW i are computed using the same random number to the bridge node.
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The bridge node makes such values public and ask all the bidders to jointly decrypt for
R i xj
(along with a
W i ’s. Particularly, for any W i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), each bidder vj transmits (αW
i)

proof that these n xj ’s are the same as that used as in the distributed key generation process,
as shown in Section 3.4.2.2) to the bridge node, which can then compute
i

Φ = Qn

Ri
βW
i

Ri xj
j=1 (αW i )

i

(g W · y r )Ri
i
i
Pn
=
= g W Ri = g W .
R
x
(g r ) i j=1 j

(3.22)

Finally, bidder vi is the winning bidder if W i = 0, or Φi = g 0 = 1.

3.5.3.3

Tie Breaking

We fnd that the auction scheme presented above fails to produce an outcome if there is
a tie in the highest or/and the second highest bidding price. A simple solution would be to
decrypt all the elements of vector B̂, which gives the locations of all the ties (including the
ties in the highest bid and the second highest bid) and the winning price as well. However,
revealing B̂ in public constitutes a breach in privacy of the bidders whose bidding statistics
will be available to potential adversaries who can use the information to their advantage
in future auctions. The only information needed to be revealed is the winning price and
the pseudo public ID of the winning bidder. In the following, we develop a scheme to
determine the auction result in presence of tie(s).
Particularly, notice that the vector (B − t · UK ), where B =

Pn

i=1

bi , results in 0

at each location corresponding to the element in the price vector where there is a tie of t
bidders. Besides, the vector B̂ − (t + 2h) · UK leads to 0 at the second highest bid position
if t bidders bid the same second highest price and h bidders bid the same highest price.
Thus, if (B − t · UK ) and B̂ − (t + 2h) · UK both result in 0 at the same location, then that
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is corresponding to the second highest price in the price vector. Consequently, the bridge
node can frst calculate the following vector


P t,h = (B − t · UK ) + (n + 1)(B̂ − (t + 2h) · UK ) ∗ R

(3.23)

for 1 ≤ h ≤ n − t and 1 ≤ t ≤ n − 1, where R is a K-dimensional nonzero random vector
jointly generated by the bidders, and the second term is multiplied by (n + 1) to make sure
the two terms do not accidently add up to zero. This vector can be re-written as
�
 �

P t,h = (B + (n + 1)B̂ − (n + 2)t + 2(n + 1)h)UK ∗ R

(3.24)

and the winning price is pw if P t,h (w) = 0. In order to ensure security and privacy, we can
follow the cryptographic process presented in Section 3.5.3.2 to verify if g P

t,h

(w)

= g 0 = 1.

Similarly, winning bidders can be identifed by checking if(b̂iw − 2) · Ri = 0 along
the line in Section 3.5.3.2, where Ri is a nonzero random number generated by bidder vi .
In the case of a tie at the highest bidding price, some specifc rules can be employed to
determine the fnal winner, e.g., the bidder who submitted his/her bid frst among all the
winners.

3.5.3.4

(M+1)st Price Auction

The private auction scheme that we have developed so far is for the case where each
seller has one unit of an item to sell at a time and a buyer is also interested in buying only
one unit of the item at a time. In this part, we investigate private auction for the scenarios
where a seller has multiple, say M (M ≥ 1), units of the same items to sell, i.e., private
(M + 1)-st price auction. In particular, each buyer is interested in buying one unit of the
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item and the top M bidders are winners who pay the (M + 1)-st highest bidding price.
Note that when M = 1, the (M + 1)st-price auction reduces to the 2nd price (Vickrey)
auction investigated above.
The basic idea for private (M + 1)-st price auction is as follows. When there is no tie
in the bidding prices, the winning price in an (M + 1)-st price auction can be obtained by
frst calculating the vector below in a similar way to (3.5), i.e.,


P = B̂ − (2M + 1) · uk ∗ R.

(3.25)

The winning price is pw if P(w) = 0. Similarly, the winning bidders can be identifed if
i

W = (b̂iw − 2) · Ri = 0.

(3.26)

When there are ties in the bidding prices, the winning price and the winning bidders can be
determined by following the same approach in Section 3.5.3.3. The cryptographic process
in Section 3.5.3.2 can be employed to provide security and privacy.

3.5.4

The Case for Bidders Dropping out Prematurely

The auction protocols defned above work requires the bidders, who participated in
the public key computation process, continue in the private auction process until all the
calculations regarding the winning price calculation and winning bidder determination are
done. If one or more bidder do not participate in the combined result calculation, the
process fails to yield any result and the auction needs to be conducted again. In order
to deter bidder nodes from leaving the auction scheme before the fnal calculations, the
bridge node can refer the misbehaving bidders to the TTP for penalty. The TTP may deny
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to assign pseudo ID to such bidders in future and the current pseudo ID may be blacklisted
and barred from future auctions by bridge nodes.

3.6

Performance Analysis
In this section we analyze the performance of the proposed secure and private auction

protocol, in terms of computation and communication costs, and security and privacy.

3.6.1
3.6.1.1

Computation and Communication Costs
Computation Cost

In what follows, we analyse the computational complexity of each bidders and that of
the bridge node, respectively.
A Bidder’s Computation Complexity is analyzed in detail below. In the pseudo ID
authentication process, a bidder conducts 2 exponentiations, denoted by EXP , in the
NIZK proof. In the distributed encryption key generation process, a bidder carries out
1 × EXP for public key generation and 1 × EXP for the corresponding ZKP. In the bid
encryption process, a bidder conducts 3K × EXP for “bid encryption”, (6K + 2) × EXP
for “ZKP generation”, and 4K × EXP for “bid signing and publishing”. In the winning
price calculation process, a bidder needs to compute 3K × EXP and another (3K +
1) × EXP for the ZKPs. In the winning bidder determination process, a bidder needs to
compute (n + 2) × EXP and another (n + 2) × EXP for the ZKPs. Therefore, the total
computational complexity of a bidder is (2n + 19K + 11) × EXP , i.e., on the order of
O(n + K) EXP operations. Note that we ignore the multiplication operation, denoted by
M U L, as it is insignifcant compared to exponentiations.
102

A Bridge Node’s Computation Complexity calculation is shown below in detail. In
the pseudo ID authentication process, a bridge node conducts 2 × EXP and 1 × M U L
for each bidder, i.e., 2n × EXP and n × M U L in total. In the distributed encryption
key generation process, a bridge node carries out 2 × EXP and 1 × M U L in the ZKP
for each bidder, and (n − 1) × M U L for computing the encryption key, i.e., 2n × EXP
and (2n − 1) × M U L in total. In the bid encryption process, a bridge node computes
8nK × EXP and 4nK × M U L for the frst ZKP and 4n × EXP and 2n × M U L for
the second ZKP for “ZKP generation”, and 4nK × EXP and 2nK × M U L for “bid
signing and publishing”, i.e., (12nK + 4n) × EXP and (6nK + 2n) × M U L in total.
In the winning price calculation process, a bridge node needs to conduct 6nK × M U L
for Enc(b̂i ), 2nK × M U L for Ecn(B̂), 3K × EXP and 4K × M U L for Enc(P),
3nK × M U L for Ω, and (8nK + 4n) × EXP and (4nK + 2n) × M U L for the two ZKPs,
i.e., (8nK + 4n + 3K) × EXP and (15nK + 2n + 4K) × M U L in total. In the winning
bidder determination process, a bridge node computes 6n × EXP and 4n × M U L in the
frst step, and n2 ×M U L in the second step, and (4n2 +8n)×EXP and (2n2 +4n)×M U L
for the two ZKPs, i.e., (4n2 + 14n) × EXP and (3n2 + 8n) × M U L in total. Thus, the
total computational complexity of a bridge node is (4n2 + 20nK + 24n + 3K) × EXP
and (3n2 + 21nK + 14n + 4K − 1) × M U L, i.e., on the order of O(n2 + nK) EXP and
O(n2 + nK) M U L operations.
Note that most of the above computation cost for a bridge node is ZKP verifcation
related computation costs (all the n2 ,and nk terms for EXP operation) In our protocols,
the bidder nodes provide non-interactive ZKPs that can be verifed by any participants of
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the auction process. bridge node can distribute the computation load for proof verifcations
(including those for ZKPs and for signatures) to other nodes without increasing computation and communication complexity for a bidder node. Besides, those ZKPs can be verifed
by any other participants in the auction. For example, bidder node j can verify the ZKPs
of node (j + k) mod n, where k ∈ [1, n − 1]. In this case the communication complexity
of all the bidder nodes and the bridge node will be O(n + K) EXP . It is also important
to point out that [7] does not include the cost for ZKP verifcation and still has O(nK)
EXP complexity. We can see that our proposed protocol has much lower computational
complexity.

3.6.1.2

Communication Cost

Note that the communication cost mainly comes from the bidders since all the ZKPs
are non-interactive. We analyze the communication cost of each bidder as follows.
In the pseudo ID authentication process, a bidder transmits z, y, and Ci to the bridge
node, i.e., 4dlog N e bits. In the distributed key generation process, a bidder sends one
dlog pe bits to construct the public key and one dlog pe + dlog qe bits ZKP to the bridge
node, i.e., 2dlog pe + dlog qe in total. In the bid encryption process, each bidder transmits K((4dlog pe + 4dlog qe) + (2dlog pe + dlog qe)) bits to prove the bids fulfll the
given requirements for “ZKP generation”. Each bidder also sends K ElGamal ciphertexts (2Kdlog pe bits), K corresponding signatures (2K(dlog N e + |h|) bits with |h| being
the size of hash digest), and his/her certifcate (2dlog N e bits). So all the cost in this process is 8Kdlog pe + 5Kdlog qe + (2K + 2)dlog N e + 2K|h| bits. In the winning price
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calculation process, each bidder needs to send 3Kdlog pe bits for α0 P i , β 0 P i , (α0 P (k))xi ,
and (2K + 1)(2dlog pe + dlog qe) bits for the corresponding ZKPs, i.e., (7K + 2)dlog pe +
(2K + 1)dlog qe bits in total. Lastly, in the winning bidder determination process, each
bidder sends (n + 2)dlog pe bits and (n + 2)(2dlog pe + dlog qe) bits, respectively, for
distributed decryption and ZKPs, i.e., (3n + 6)dlog pe + (n + 2)dlog qe bits in total. Therefore, total communication cost per bidder is (2dlog N e + 15dlog pe + 7dlog qe + 2|h|)K +
(3dlog pe + dlog qe)n + (6dlog N e + 10dlog pe + 4dlog qe) bits, and hence on the order of
O(n + K).
Therefore, the total communication complexity of each node in our scheme can be
proved to be O(n + K) bits, while that in [7] is O(nK) bits.

3.6.2

Security and Privacy Analysis

We then investigate the security and privacy of the proposed auction framework SPA.
We show as follows that SPA is secure and privacy-preserving not only under the honestbut-curious model, but also with regard to the malicious bidders who may want to deviate
from the protocols to disrupt and/or learn more about the other bidders.
Theorem 8
[Privacy] A bidder’s privacy is preserved regardless of the number of other colluding bidders. A seller’s privacy is preserved too.
Proof: A bidder obtains a pair of public/private pseudo IDs in the identity initiation phase
whenever he/she wants to participate in an auction. The bidder can use different such
pseudo IDs for different auctions. Thus, the identity privacy can be preserved and the
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bidder cannot be traced. Besides, our proposed auction scheme employs a distributed
ElGamal cryptosystem. Unlike (n, k) threshold cryptosystems, where a ciphertext can be
decrypted if k-out-of-n participants collude, our encryption scheme constructs a public key
in an n-out-of-n secret sharing fashion. Therefore, a bidder’s bidding vector encrypted with
the public key can only be decrypted if the bidder participates in the distributed decryption.
In our auction protocol, bidders do not collaboratively decrypt their own encrypted bidding
vectors. They only jointly decrypt for g P(w) as shown in (3.20), which is equal to 1 if pw
is the winning price and some random number otherwise. Thus, a bidder’s bidding price
privacy can also be preserved. Note that as mentioned before, we do not consider the
possible adversaries at the DHT and Internet layers, since there have been several works
addressing the privacy issues there [69, 70] and our DHT protocols can be easily adapted.
Similarly, since a seller can use different public pseudo IDs for different auctions,
his/her identity privacy and trading history can be protected too.
Theorem 9
[Authenticity and Non-Repudiation] A bidder with legal pseudo IDs and legitimate bidding
vectors can always be authenticated. Besides, a bid can be traced back to the bidder.
Proof: Due to the public pseudo ID authentication process, a malicious bidder cannot use a
fake public pseudo ID or impersonate some other bidder to pass the authentication process
according to Theorem 4 and 5. Legitimate bidding vectors can also be verifed in the “ZKP
generation” step of the bid encryption process. Besides, since each bidder signs his/her
bids using an anonymous signature scheme based on their public and private pseudo IDs

106

as shown in the bid encryption process, a bid can be traced back to the bidder according to
Theorem 6 and 7.
Theorem 10
[Auction Correctness] The proposed auction protocol results in correct outcomes with high
probability (w.h.p.).
Proof: The winning price obtained from (3.20) will result in unintended outcomes if for
ˆ

some 1 ≤ k ≤ K, we have (B̂k − 3) =
6 0 but g (Bk −3)·Rk ≡ 1 mod p. Similarly, the
winning bidder obtained from (3.22) will be incorrect if for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have
i

(b̂iw − 2) =
6 0 but g (b̂w −2)·Ri ≡ 1 mod p, where pw is the winning price. However, since
p is usually a very large number (e.g., 1024 bits), the probability of the occurrence of the
above events is very low (≈ 1/21024 ). Therefore, the proposed auction protocol results in
correct outcomes with high probability.
Theorem 11
[Auction Security] A malicious bidder deviating from the auction protocol cannot disrupt
the auction outcome without being detected.
Proof: In our auction protocol, a malicious bidder may try to disrupt the auction outcome
by indulging in the intermediate computations in the protocol. Notice that in the winning
price calculation process, each bidder needs to submit ZKPs to prove that for each 1 ≤
i

i

k ≤ K, (αPk )Rk and (βPk )Rk are obtained using the same random value, and another ZKP
0
(k))xi ’s (1 ≤ k ≤ K) are computed using the same xi as in the key
to prove that (αP

generation phase. In the winner bidder determination process, each bidder vi submits a
Ri
Ri
ZKP that αW
i , βW i are computed using the same random number and another ZKP that
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R i xj
the xj ’s used in computing (αW
(1 ≤ i ≤ n) are the same as that used as in the
i)

distributed key generation process. Thus, any attempt to disrupt the auction outcome by
deviating the protocol steps can be detected.
Table 3.3
Performance of our advertisement distribution scheme.
Soical Network Data Set
LiveJournal Social Network [71]
Astro Physics Collaboration
Network [44]
Orkut Online Social Network [71]
Synthetic Data Set Using Nearest
Neighbor (modifed) Model [64]

3.7

Normalized Hop Count
0.78
0.75
0.71
0.64

Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed secure and private auc-

tion framework SPA, particularly the advertisement distribution algorithm and the private
auction scheme. In particular, we implement SPA on a PC with a Core i7 processor and
4GB RAM. We also implement the second price auction protocol [7]. In the experiments,
the primes p and q in ElGamal cryptosystem are 1024 bits and 768 bits, respectively. The
modulus N in the anonymous signature scheme is 1024 bits. Any hash function used in
SPA results in digests of 128 bits.
We frst evaluate the performance of our advertisement distribution algorithm. We
implement it on several real social network graphs obtained from the SNAP project [3] as
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Figure 3.3
Comparison of Computation Cost (ms) when K = 500, n ∈ [1, 10000]
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well as on a synthetic data set simulating OSNs. For each of these networks, we choose 100
random source and bridge node pairs and measure the average number of hops required to
reach the bridge nodes. Table 3.3 shows the hop counts (normalized by log2 n where n is
the network size) based on different network data sets. The network data sets are listed
in increasing order of average node degree. Intuitively, fewer hops are needed to deliver
messages in networks with higher average node degrees. We can see that all advertisement
messages can be delivered in O(log n) hops.
We then evaluate the performance of proposed the private auction scheme. We set the
size of the price vector to 500. Lipmaa et al. [51] show that k ≤ 500 suffces in most
auctions in practice. Figure 3.3 compares the computation time of our protocol with that
of [7]. We can see that the computation time of the bridge node and that of each bidder
is well within the practical limits (∼ 100 seconds) even when the number of bidders is
large. In contrast, the computation time of a bidder in [7] is much higher (two orders
of magnitude higher), and hence the protocol is impractical when the number of bidders is
large. Likewise, as shown in Figure 3.4, the communication cost of a bidder in our protocol
is much lower than that of a bidder in [7]. For example, in the case where there are 10000
bidders, the computation time of a bidder in our protocol is about 32.5 seconds and that
of a bridge node is about 56.8 seconds, while the communication cost of a bidder is about
47MB. In the same case, the computation time of a bidder in [7] is more than 9.5 hours,
and the communication cost of a bidder is about 35GB.
We also present the experiment results in Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 with different K’s
and n’s. We can easily fnd that our auction protocol is much more effcient in terms of
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Figure 3.5
Comparision of Computation Cost (ms) when n, K ∈ [1, 10000]
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Figure 3.6
Comparison of Communication Cost (bits) when n, K ∈ [1, 10000]
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both the computation cost and communication cost and is suitable for practical application
even when both the size of the price vector and the number of bidders are large.

3.8

Conclusion
In this work, we have presented a secure and private auction framework, SPA, for

DOSNs. System security can be protected against malicious attackers who try to disrupt
auction outcomes by indulging in the intermediate computations in the protocol. Users’
privacy, including their IDs and bidding prices, can also be guaranteed. In addition, SPA
provides authenticity and non-repudiation, which are not made possible in previous auction
schemes. The computation and communication complexities of our auction scheme are
both O(n+K). In contrast, the most effcient existing private auction schemes like [7] have
complexities of O(nK). Extensive experiment results have demonstrated the effciency of
the proposed framework.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE PLANS

In this dissertation, in Chapter 2, we proposed an asymmetric social proximity metric
between two users in an OSN. The measure takes into account the user’s own and his/her
friends’ weighted attributes (communities) while calculating social proximity. We then designed three cryptographic protocols to privately calculate social proximity between two
users who may have different privacy requirements. In our privacy level 3 (L3P) protocol, each user is able to privately check if his/her proximity measure satisfes individually
defned private threshold before establishing a friendship relationship and revealing more
information about each other. The proposed asymmetric proximity model is validated
using real social network data set. We also conduct extensive simulations to study the
performance of the protocols and compare against existing state-of-the-art protocols.
In Chapter 3 we, for the frst time, proposed a framework for secure and private auction
based marketplace for decentralized online social network. The private auction protocol
does not require the presence of third party (auctioneer) for the correctness and security of
the auction. The participants in the auction scheme do not need to trust other participants
for the auction, they trade anonymously, with authenticity and non-repudiation . We also
proposed a distributed buyer seller matching algorithm to effciently match buyer and sell-
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ers for a given item and tested the effciency of the algorithm using social network data sets.
Our specifc architecture of the framework makes it effcient enough to be applicable for
the cases when there are large number of bidders. We verify the effciency with extensive
simulations.
As we increasingly generate and consume enormous amount of digital information, the
security and privacy issues have become more important than ever. Future systems design
needs to be secure not only against the usual malicious attacker(s), but also against the
advanced persistent threats (APTs) and global surveillance capability of very resourceful
entities. In the future, we will continue to work on these challenges and work on design
and implementation robust, secure, and privacy friendly systems in the feld of wireless
network, complex networks, cyber physical system, and big data systems.
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